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FOIA’s Common Law 
John C. Brinkerhoff Jr.† 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) replaced the near-total control 
that agencies held over their records with a judicially enforceable “right” of 
public access to agency information. Underscoring the importance of this 
statutory right, FOIA rejected the judiciary’s traditional respect for agency 
expertise. It instead places the burden of proof on the government and mandates 
de novo review in litigation. And yet, agencies still effectively control the terms 
of information disclosure. The government wins nine out of every ten FOIA cases 
in court. This ratio is a startling departure from other areas of administrative 
law, where agencies generally enjoy much lower win rates. 
This Article provides a framework for understanding this tension. Tracing 
FOIA’s doctrines to their roots, it finds that FOIA jurisprudence reflects the 
well-established “administrative common law” approach that courts apply 
elsewhere in administrative law. Specifically, courts have used functional or 
policy-based reasoning to transport preexisting evidentiary and administrative 
law doctrines to FOIA litigation, often in ways that challenge statutory text. 
Because these pre-FOIA doctrines overwhelmingly empowered the executive, 
the ensuing doctrines that courts grafted onto FOIA (“FOIA’s common law”) 
predictably and consistently favor agencies. 
Recognizing FOIA doctrine as a subset of administrative common law 
holds broader implications. It provides a meaningful baseline for critique by 
situating FOIA within a larger debate over the judiciary’s proper role in the 
administrative state. It also offers new perspectives on how Congress can 
counteract the inertial forces driving FOIA’s common law. Finally, it informs 
the debate over administrative common law by showing the method’s resilience 
in an area where Congress has been uniquely active. 
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Introduction 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a conspicuously pro-disclosure 
statute. It allows any person to request any records on any subject from federal 
agencies.1 Agencies must provide nearly all responsive records to requesters 
unless they fall within one of nine “specifically stated” exemptions.2 Even if part 
of a record is exempt, agencies still have a duty to disclose any “reasonably 
segregable” non-exempt information.3 In litigation, agencies hold the burden of 
proof and courts review the entire matter de novo.4 Overlaying these provisions, 
FOIA’s short title declares that the statute’s purpose is to “clarify and protect the 
 
 1.   5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2018). 
 2.   Id. § 552(d). FOIA’s exemptions cover (1) properly classified information, (2) 
“internal personnel rules and practices,” (3) information that other statutes exempt from disclosure, (4) 
privileged or confidential commercial information and trade secrets, (5) privileged internal agency 
memoranda or letters, (6) some materials that would “constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy if disclosed,” (7) certain law-enforcement information, (8) some reports created by agencies that 
regulate financial institutions, and (9) certain geological and geophysical information. Id. § 552(b). FOIA 
also contains three narrow “exclusions” for information that agencies do not have to acknowledge when 
responding to a FOIA request. Id. § 552(c) (excluding records of ongoing law-enforcement investigations 
where the suspect is not aware of the investigation, certain FBI intelligence records, and some confidential 
informant records). 
 3.   Id. § 552(b). 
 4.   Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
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right of the public to information,”5 while congressional findings in a later 
amendment emphasize that FOIA mandates a “strong presumption in favor of 
disclosure.”6 The Supreme Court has sensibly read these statutory instructions to 
require that courts narrowly construe FOIA’s exemptions7 and resolve any 
ambiguity in favor of disclosure.8 
This pro-disclosure framework is “deliberate.”9 As then-Professor Scalia 
noted, these provisions “can only be understood as the product of the 
extraordinary era that produced them.”10 Much of FOIA’s modern framework is 
the offspring of a Congress fueled by post-Watergate fury and a scandal-plagued 
executive unable to resist.11 Even today, FOIA’s leading treatise observes that 
the statute embodies “the power of frustration reflected in congressional distrust 
for agency withholding.”12  
And yet, plaintiffs who sue recalcitrant agencies under FOIA face a stark 
reality: Courts “almost instinctively” side with the government,13 ninety percent 
of the time according to some estimates.14 FOIA’s results are, by far, outliers in 
administrative law, much of which falls under judicial doctrines that explicitly 
call for deference to agencies.15 When these outcomes are considered alongside 
the well-documented delays and denials that plaintiffs face at the agency level,16 
 
 5.   Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 250 (July 4, 1966). 
 6.   OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 2(1)(3), 121 Stat. 2524, 
2524; accord U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). 
 7.   E.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011) (“[FOIA’s] exemptions 
are ‘explicitly made exclusive’ and ‘must be narrowly construed.’” (first quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 
73, 79 (1973); and then quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982))); see also ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 362 (2012) (concluding 
that FOIA is one of the “rare[]” statutes for which a narrow construction of exceptions is justified). 
 8.   See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 366 (1976) (“FOIA requires us to 
choose that interpretation most favoring disclosure.”); see also John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 
U.S. 146, 164 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur doctrine of ‘narrowly construing’ FOIA exemptions 
requires . . . ambiguity to be resolved in favor of disclosure.”). 
 9.   Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 188 (2013); see also 
1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 8:22, at 630 (Winter 2018) (“Deference to 
the findings of an expert agency has a part to play in virtually all administrative law controversies, except 
a FOIA case.”). 
 10.   Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG.: AEI J. ON 
GOV’T & SOC’Y, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14, 15. 
 11.   See id. at 15-16. Congress enacted FOIA in 1966, but “[t]he 1966 version was a 
relatively toothless beast, sometimes kicked about shamelessly by the agencies.” Id. at 15. Congress 
greatly strengthened FOIA’s mandate and adopted many of its modern provisions in 1974. See Freedom 
of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561. 
 12.   1 O’REILLY, supra note 9, § 3:8, at 56 (2018). 
 13.   Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 679, 713 (2002). 
 14.   See 1 O’REILLY, supra note 9, § 7:1, at 242; Verkuil, supra note 13, at 713.  
 15.   See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 169 (2010) (finding 
a sixty-to-seventy percent agency affirmance rate under Chevron, Skidmore, and arbitrary and capricious 
review); see also William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1100 (2008) 
(finding that the Supreme Court affirms agency legal interpretations sixty-eight percent of the time). 
 16.   Laurence Tai, Fast Fixes for FOIA, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 465 (2015) (“In the 
aggregate, the prevalence of delays, questionable denials, and commercial requests, strongly suggests that 
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it is perhaps unsurprising that commentators have largely concluded that FOIA 
has failed its mission.17 Congress apparently agrees. Congressional findings in a 
2006 amendment to FOIA conceded that “in practice, the Freedom of 
Information Act has not always lived up to the ideals of that Act.”18 Newspapers 
have been more colorful, with one columnist calling FOIA “a Rube Goldberg 
apparatus that clanks and wheezes, but rarely turns up the data.”19 
The conventional accounts of the government’s dominance in FOIA 
litigation blame either the judge-made deference regimes that shield agencies 
from searching judicial scrutiny20 or the ostensibly FOIA-specific procedural 
hurdles that courts impose on requesters.21 This Article contends that these 
explanations misdiagnose symptoms of FOIA’s failure as the disease. Both track 
a larger pattern that underpins a wide swath of FOIA doctrines: Judicial 
interpretations of FOIA correlate strongly with pre-FOIA discovery and 
administrative law holdings. Further, the opinions that adapted these doctrines 
to FOIA litigation relied heavily on functional or prudential reasoning to reach 
holdings at odds with statutory text. Because pre-FOIA doctrines gave the 
executive branch near-total control over information disclosure, correlating 
interpretations of FOIA have likewise given agencies an overwhelming win rate. 
Meanwhile, FOIA’s pro-disclosure provisions have taken a back seat. The final 
product is a strong, pro-government gloss over nearly all of FOIA. This Article 
labels this gloss “FOIA’s common law.” 
 
many agencies have significant problems in their implementation of the Act.”); see also Mark Fenster, 
The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 891 (2006) (describing how “executive officers and 
agencies routinely deny access to the government’s inner workings,” making “open government seem[] 
more like a distant, deferred ideal than an actually existing practice”). This Article does not address 
agency-level problems with FOIA’s implementation.  
 17.   See, e.g., Mark Fenster, FOIA as an Administrative Law, in TROUBLING 
TRANSPARENCY: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 52, 52 (David E. Pozen & 
Michael Schudson eds., 2018) (noting that “the conventional wisdom among transparency advocates and 
the press” is that FOIA’s “history is a sad, disappointing story of a second-best, not very good 
alternative”); Tai, supra note 16, at 456 (“Despite these widespread beliefs in the Act’s benefits, its 
success in implementation has fallen far short of the statute’s goals . . . .”); see also STAFF OF H. COMM. 
ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 114TH CONG., FOIA IS BROKEN: A REPORT, at ii (2016) (collecting 
feedback from FOIA stakeholders about “delays, abusive fees, inappropriate redactions, and other tactics 
frustrating the FOIA process”). 
 18.   OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 2(1)(5), 121 Stat. 2524, 
2524. 
 19.   David Carr, Let the Sun Shine, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/business/media/23carr.html [https://perma.cc/VCZ2-2X8M]. 
 20.   See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the 
Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 652-58 (2005); Nathan Slegers, Comment, De Novo 
Review Under the Freedom of Information Act: The Case Against Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions 
to Withhold Information, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209, 224-32 (2006). 
 21.   See, e.g., John C. Brinkerhoff Jr. & Daniel B. Listwa, Deference Conservation—
FOIA’s Lessons for a Chevron-less World, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 146, 151-52 (2018); Kwoka, supra 
note 9, at 211; Rebecca Silver, Comment, Standard of Review in FOIA Appeals and the Misuse of 
Summary Judgment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 731 (2006). For a discussion on some of these hurdles, see 
infra Section I.B.5. 
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FOIA’s common law is not unique. It is an extension of “administrative 
common law,” the well-documented method that courts use when interpreting 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Under this approach, courts draw 
decisions from “judicial conceptions of appropriate institutional roles, along with 
pragmatic and normative concerns, that are frequently constitutionally infused 
and developed incrementally through precedent.”22 No article has analyzed the 
implications of administrative common law outside of traditional APA litigation. 
This Article examines such an effect within FOIA. It proceeds in three 
parts. Part I introduces FOIA’s common law as a prominent force in FOIA 
jurisprudence. After providing a brief account of administrative common law 
and its connection to FOIA, it illustrates FOIA’s common law through five 
doctrinal case studies. Part II links FOIA’s common law to its pro-government 
outcomes, detailing how FOIA’s fundamental incompatibility with preexisting 
administrative and evidentiary common law undermined its mission. It then 
discusses the survival of FOIA’s common law in an increasingly textualist 
judicial environment. 
Part III considers some implications of FOIA’s common law. It first uses 
the debate over administrative common law as a lens to evaluate the legitimacy 
of FOIA’s common law. It then explores why courts targeted FOIA for the 
administrative common law treatment, looking at the role of established 
precedent and the concurrent development of APA doctrine as catalysts. Next, it 
leverages FOIA’s common law to make a broader assessment of how Congress 
could counteract well-entrenched federal common law. It concludes with a brief 
discussion on the lessons that FOIA’s common law holds for the larger 
administrative common law debate. 
I. Defining FOIA’s Common Law 
This Part briefly examines the administrative common law method and its 
relation to FOIA. It then details the contours of FOIA’s common law through 
five case studies that encompass substantive and procedural facets of FOIA 
litigation. Each case study originated from pre-FOIA judicial doctrines, departs 
from statutory text, and is grounded in functional or policy-based reasoning, 
fitting the administrative common law paradigm. 
A. Situating FOIA Within the Administrative Common Law Method 
Broadly speaking, administrative common law is judicial doctrine that 
“exceeds the boundaries of any permissible interpretation” of the APA or other 
 
 22.   Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1293, 1295 (2012); see also Jack M. Beerman, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative 
Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“[F]ederal courts may not actually behave all that differently than 
court systems with an openly acknowledged common law tradition in administrative law.”). 
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administrative statutes.23 Digging deeper, it holds two key features. First, it 
emphasizes functional, institutional, and prudential considerations over statutory 
text.24 Second, it develops incrementally over time through precedent, often from 
pre-APA federal common law.25 Collectively, it represents an expansive body of 
doctrine that “would be ‘unrecognizable’ to the APA’s drafters.”26 
Ripeness, the presumption in favor of judicial review, and the “logical 
outgrowth” doctrine are all administrative common law doctrines.27 A 
quintessential example is the Chevron doctrine, which holds that courts must 
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.28 The Chevron 
Court never cited the APA, which mandates that courts “shall decide all relevant 
questions of law [and] interpret . . . statutory provisions.”29 It instead relied on 
institutional concerns and pre-APA common law.30 And without statutory 
grounding, Chevron evolved substantially over time.31 
It is not surprising that courts have taken a common law approach to FOIA. 
When Congress enacted it, Louis Jaffe’s Judicial Control of Administrative 
Action, the “summa theologica of this era of administrative law scholarship,”32 
simply noted as a descriptive fact that a “common law of review” defined 
administrative law.33 The other leading treatise at the time agreed, observing that 
“most of [administrative law] is common law in every sense.”34 As the defining 
theory of administrative law during FOIA’s formative years, administrative 
common law is central to understanding the statute’s development. 
 
 23.   Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. 
L.J. 1207, 1212 (2015). Other definitions are broader. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers 
of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (“‘Federal common law’ . . . means any federal rule of 
decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text, whether or not that rule can 
be described as the product of ‘interpretation’ in either a conventional or an unconventional sense.”).  
 24.   See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 22, at 1313. 
 25.   Beerman, supra note 22, at 3; see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law 
in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 119 (1998) (contending that administrative common law is 
partially motivated by judges fighting to maintain their pre-APA authority as “law-givers”). 
 26.   Roberta Romano, Does Agency Structure Affect Agency Decisionmaking? 
Implications of the CFPB’s Design for Administrative Governance, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 273, 278 (2019) 
(quoting GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 308 (7th ed. 2016)). 
 27.   See Beerman, supra note 22, at 8. 
 28.   See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 29.   5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). Others have discussed this tension. See, e.g., Beerman, supra 
note 22, at 22; Duffy, supra note 25, at 193-97. Perhaps underscoring Chevron’s judicial origins, it is 
unclear whether courts should treat Chevron as a precedent, standard of review, or canon. See James 
Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 183, 188-190 (2019). 
 30.   See Metzger, supra note 22, at 1302 (explaining that the Chevron Court justified its 
decision with “general assumptions about congressional intent, constitutional considerations about the 
appropriate bounds of the judicial role, and the relative accountability of courts and agencies”). 
 31.   E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (limiting Chevron to certain 
agency actions). Like Chevron, Mead lacks grounding in the APA. See Metzger, supra note 22, at 1302. 
 32.   Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
953, 955 n.1 (1997). 
 33.   LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 329 (1965). 
 34.   1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.18, at 140 (2d ed. 
1978); see also id. (“Perhaps about nine-tenths of American administrative law is judge-made law . . . .”). 
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Of course, administrative common law is more complex than this summary 
suggests. It is often difficult to identify “where statutory interpretation ends and 
common law begins.”35 Some commentators define administrative common law 
as any doctrine formed without guidance from statutory text.36 Others require 
doctrine to clash with other interpretive sources, such as legislative intent and 
statutory purpose.37 Moreover, most administrative common law doctrines claim 
tenuous “statutory hooks” in the APA or some other statute,38 so the difference 
between statutory interpretation and common law is often “a difference in 
emphasis rather than a difference in kind.”39 This nuance often focuses the task 
of classifying administrative common law on parsing how tenuously a given 
doctrine fits with the APA.40 Some commentators pursuing this inquiry have 
turned to what Evan Bernick has coined “proto-APA originalism,” looking to the 
APA’s original meaning as a criterion for the legitimacy of administrative 
common law doctrines.41 
This Article does not wade too deeply into this process. Its goal is not to 
comprehensively categorize FOIA jurisprudence or engage with doctrines that 
lie at the margins. It only presents the modest case that administrative common 
law operates on FOIA in a material way. To be sure, it is impossible to 
completely avoid disputes over classification. Some commentators argue that 
even the clearest examples of administrative common law are indistinguishable 
from the judiciary’s traditional approaches to statutory interpretation.42 Still, this 
Article mitigates these disputes by limiting its analysis to doctrines that not only 
conflict with FOIA’s text, but also that evolved from pre-FOIA administrative 
or discovery doctrines and that courts justified with functional, institutional, or 
policy considerations. 
FOIA itself also makes this inquiry clearer than the rest of the APA. 
Whatever interpretive relevance purposive analysis might have elsewhere, 
FOIA’s purpose—to “protect the right of the public to information”—is textually 
 
 35.   Kovacs, supra note 23, at 1212.  
 36.   See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 25, at 115. 
 37.   See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 22, at 1311. 
 38.   Id. at 1310. 
 39.   Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of 
Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980). 
 40.   See Metzger, supra note 22, at 1311. 
 41.   Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70 
ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 830 (2018). For example, Aditya Bamzai challenged Chevron’s legitimacy by 
conducting a thorough analysis of pre-APA judicial review of executive branch legal interpretations. See 
Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017); 
see also Steven J. Lindsay, Note, Timing Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations in Chevron’s Shadow, 
127 YALE L.J. 2448 (2017) (reconciling contemporary administrative common law with the historical 
practice of giving legal force to interpretive rules).  
 42.   See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for 
the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 801 (2013); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 208 (2006) (offering that 
Chevron might be justified if “the meaning of the relevant law just is what the agencies say that it is”). 
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embedded in the statute.43 Albeit to varying degrees, such statements are largely 
accepted as interpretive aides.44 Deploying purposivism to favor secrecy would 
inherently involve weighing and rejecting this textual purpose in favor of an 
inapposite, non-textual “purpose.” Such a process would be a normative 
enterprise, dovetailing with William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s conclusion 
that the “attribution of purpose will inevitably be influenced by the interpreter’s 
current context and the evolution of the statute over time.”45 Accordingly, this 
Article classifies any “purposive” analysis that departs from FOIA’s textual 
purpose as administrative common law.  
B. Case Studies in FOIA’s Common Law 
Existing accounts of administrative common law overlook FOIA.46 This 
Section fills the gap with five case studies that encompass some of FOIA’s most 
frequently invoked doctrines. It begins with three of FOIA’s exemptions—
defenses that agencies raise to withhold responsive information. It then moves 
to non-statutory deference regimes and concludes with the judge-made burden-
shifting standard that exists in procedural disputes across FOIA. 
1. Exemption 5 and “Inter-Agency or Intra-Agency” Records 
Exemption 5 allows agencies to protect “inter-agency or intra-agency 
memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a [non-agency] 
party in litigation.”47 The Supreme Court has reasonably interpreted this 
exemption to allow agencies to claim some of the privileges that they receive in 
litigation, such as the deliberative process privilege.48 But most appellate courts 
have gone further. They hold that even though the exemption is limited to “inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters,” agencies can use it to protect 
records that consultants or other outside parties create. 
 
 43.   Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 250 (July 4, 1966). 
 44.   See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO 
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 106 (2016) (asserting that textual purposes have “added 
significance” because they have been enacted into law); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 217-18 
(agreeing that expressions of purpose in statutory text can be used to resolve statutory ambiguities). 
 45.   William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 358 (1990); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 18-19 (noting 
that purposivism’s “manipulability” enables judges to climb “levels of abstraction” to reach desired 
results). 
 46.   Gillian Metzger examined one FOIA case, but she did not distinguish FOIA from 
the rest of the APA. See Metzger, supra note 22, at 1306-08. 
 47.   5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018). If an agency raises the deliberative process privilege, 
it must also prove that it created the record within twenty-five years of the FOIA request. Id. 
 48.   See FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 32 (1983). But see Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354 (1979) (noting that it was “not clear that Exemption 
5 was intended to incorporate every privilege known to civil discovery” and that extending Exemption 5 
to new privileges should be “viewed with caution”). 
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It is doubtful that any reasonable reading of “inter-agency or intra-agency” 
could encompass third parties. But even if it could, FOIA itself eliminates doubt. 
It defines “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United States” 
in the executive branch, including “any executive department, military 
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or 
other establishment in the Executive Branch of the Government . . . or any 
independent regulatory agency.”49 Third parties plainly fall outside this 
definition. 
Courts did not try to square their interpretation with FOIA’s text. They 
instead reasoned that “common sense”50 or “[a] moment’s reflection”51 
demanded that they adopt “a functional rather than a literal test in assessing 
whether memoranda are ‘inter-agency or intra-agency.’”52 The first court to 
consider the issue did so in a footnote; it offered without further discussion that 
“[t]he Government may have a special need for the opinions and 
recommendations of temporary consultants, and those individuals should be able 
to give their judgments freely without fear of publicity.”53 The government’s 
“special need[s]” have nothing to do with whether a memorandum is “inter-
agency or intra-agency.” Still, other circuits adopted this interpretation, which 
came to be known as the “consultant corollary,” by simply citing this footnote.54 
Without text to ground it, the interpretation evolved over time. Following 
a Supreme Court decision that questioned the propriety of protecting third-party 
information through Exemption 5,55 multiple circuits held that the exemption 
does not protect information submitted by parties that have an interest in a related 
agency proceeding.56 One circuit also carved out an exception to this exception, 
holding that Exemption 5 protects the records of self-interested parties that share 
the same interest as the government.57 These distinctions are of course absent 
from Exemption 5’s text. 
 
 49.   §§ 551(1), 552(f)(1). 
 50.   Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 51.   CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 52.   Durns v. Bureau of Prisons, 804 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds by 486 U.S. 1029 (1988) (mem.). 
 53.   Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 54.   See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass’n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing Soucie, 
448 F.2d at 1078 n.44); Wu v. Nat’l Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(citing Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1078 n.44). But see Lucaj v. FBI, 852 F.3d 541, 549 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting 
the interpretation). Even Justice Scalia, no champion of policy-based interpretation, found the policy 
considerations too tempting. He acknowledged that “the most natural meaning” of the first requirement 
would exclude outside parties. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 18 n.1 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). But he concluded that extending Exemption 5 to third parties was “textually possible” and 
“desirable” because it aligned with “Exemption 5’s purpose of protecting the Government’s deliberative 
process.” Id. 
 55.   See Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 9 
(2001). For further discussion, see infra notes 191-198 and accompanying text. 
 56.   See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 512 F.3d 677, 681 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 57.   Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 287-88 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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The interpretation itself evolved from the deliberative process privilege, 
which gained prominence in the years before FOIA’s enactment.58 Justice Reed 
offered the paradigmatic formulation of the privilege, noting that it protected 
“open, frank discussion between subordinate and chief concerning 
administrative action.”59 This broad privilege included third-party statements to 
agency officials.60 Tellingly, one of the earliest courts to extend Exemption 5 to 
third parties discussed the “leading” pre-FOIA case for protecting third-party 
statements.61  
But Congress did not transfer this privilege to FOIA unscathed. It added a 
requirement that records be “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or 
letters.”62 Courts appeared to ignore this obligation, focusing instead on the 
government’s “special needs.” By doing so, they failed to consider how FOIA 
departed from the government’s traditional privileges. 
2. Exemption 4 and “Confidential” Commercial Information 
Exemption 4 protects trade secrets and any “privileged or confidential” 
“commercial or financial information” that agencies receive from private 
parties.63 Most Exemption 4 litigation hinges on whether commercial 
information is “confidential.”64 This term was not new to FOIA. FOIA’s 
predecessor—the APA’s public disclosure section—allowed agencies to 
withhold information that they considered “confidential for good cause found.”65 
Agencies often designated information that private parties submitted in 
 
 58.   See T. D. Taubeneck & John J. Sexton, Executive Privilege and the Court’s Right 
to Know—Discovery Against the United States in Civil Actions in Federal District Courts, 48 GEO. L.J. 
486, 507 (1960) (“[T]he Executive’s interest in privacy extends as well to all other internal transactions 
and documents. . . . [M]emoranda and other expressions of opinion should be protected . . . .”); see also 
HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND 
PROCEEDINGS 198 (1953) (“Records of the Executive Departments are indeed ‘quasi-confidential,’ 
‘privileged communications’ commonly beyond the reach of the public, press, or courts.”).  
 59.   Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 
1958) (Reed, J.); accord Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 219, 226 (8th Cir. 1955); see also E.W. Bliss 
Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 175, 176 (N.D. Ohio 1961) (holding that “in all but exceptional cases,” 
the government “must have the benefit of [its agents’] full, free advices”). Although the deliberative 
process privilege gained popularity around the time of FOIA’s passage, courts had long recognized 
variants of it. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (concluding that “[i]t would seriously 
cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs” if an executive official was “under an 
apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of 
inquiry in a civil suit for damages”).  
 60.   See Taubeneck & Sexton, supra note 58, at 505 (“[T]here has been little inclination 
to make information more readily available on the ground that it was from outsiders.”). 
 61.   See Brockway v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1191-92 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(citing Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). 
 62.   5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018). 
 63.   Id. § 552(b)(4). 
 64.   See 2 O’REILLY, supra note 9, § 14.26, at 511. 
 65.   5 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1964). 
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confidence as “confidential,” which protected it from public access.66 By using 
“confidential” while dropping any “good cause” requirement, Exemption 4 
likely sought to preserve this framework and protect information that private 
parties submitted to agencies in confidence, so long as it was “commercial or 
financial.” This interpretation would track early circuit holdings67 and one fair 
reading of the exemption.68 
Of course, “confidential” might be susceptible to other interpretations. But 
that question is ultimately beside the point. It is enough that the dominant judicial 
interpretation of the term, which the D.C. Circuit established in National Parks 
& Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, misses the mark. National Parks defines 
confidential in terms of policy outcomes: Information is confidential when its 
disclosure would (1) “impair the Government’s ability to obtain necessary 
information in the future” or (2) “cause substantial harm to the competitive 
position of the person” providing the information.69 The National Parks Court 
reached this holding by looking to “legislative purpose,” which it found within 
the congressional testimony of executive officials.70 The final holding 
unsurprisingly bore little resemblance to FOIA’s text. Nevertheless, every circuit 
to consider the issue has followed the National Parks framework.71 
This interpretation, unmoored from FOIA’s text, also evolved. The D.C. 
Circuit later cabined the National Parks test to information that private parties 
voluntarily provide to the government, adopting a different test for involuntarily 
submitted information.72 Other circuits expanded National Parks to consider 
 
 66.   See 2 O’REILLY, supra note 9, § 14.2, at 481; see also James A. Pike & Henry G. 
Fischer, Discovery Against Federal Administrative Agencies, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1943) (“An 
agency holding the information in a special capacity may not be compelled to produce the secrets of one 
citizen for the benefit of another any more than an attorney may be.”). See generally Milton M. Carrow, 
Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PENN. L. REV. 166, 188 (1958) (identifying 
similar protections in pre-FOIA statutes). 
 67.   See Gen. Servs. Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[T]he 
exemption is meant to protect information that a private individual wishes to keep confidential for his own 
purposes, but reveals to the government under the express or implied promise by the government that the 
information will be kept confidential.”); see also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (holding that Exemption 4 covers information that “would customarily not be released to the public 
by the person from whom it was obtained” (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813 (1965))). 
 68.   See Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 931 F.2d 939, 
947 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph, J., concurring) (noting that “[i]f ordinary usage controlled,” confidential 
would simply mean records that are “conveyed [and] acted on . . . in confidence” and are “not publicly 
disseminated” (quoting Confidential, WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981))). 
 69.   498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 70.   Id. at 768-70 (quoting Hearing on S. 1666 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice 
& Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 199 (1963) (statement of Norbert A. Schlei, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)). The court also cited FOIA’s House and Senate reports, as 
well as a statement from a floor debate over a predecessor to FOIA, all for the broad proposition that third-
party information needed protection. Id. at 767 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 17,667 (1964) (statement of Sen. 
Humphrey)). But these sources did not speak directly to Exemption 4, much less National Park’s holding. 
 71.   See, e.g., Pac. Architects & Eng’rs Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 906 F.2d 1345, 1347 
(9th Cir. 1990); Acumenics Res. & Tech. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 843 F.2d 800, 807 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 72.    Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 879 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that involuntarily provided information was confidential when it was 
“of a kind that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained”). 
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whether disclosure would harm any “identifiable private or governmental 
interest.”73 One notable addition was the amorphous “interest” of preventing the 
“impairment of the effectiveness of a government program.”74  
These tests might appear, as one judge lamented, “fabricated, out of whole 
cloth.”75 But they mirror pre-FOIA discovery protections. Although agencies 
could use the “confidential” label to protect third-party records from public 
disclosure under FOIA’s predecessor, confidentiality was not a shield to 
discovery in litigation.76 There, private litigants could obtain confidential records 
if they established “good cause.”77 Specifically, they had to prove that their need 
for the “confidential” information outweighed the government’s interest in 
secrecy.78 The National Parks test and its progeny mirror three common 
government interests in these disputes—(1) the need to use privacy to “induce[] 
. . . full disclosure” from private citizens,79 (2) the competitive harm that might 
result from disclosure of trade secrets to competitors,80 and (3) the risk that 
violating an agency’s “promises of confidentiality would hamper the efficient 
operation of an important Government program.”81 
 
 73.   9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
721 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1983); accord Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 
320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[O]ther interests may indeed be considered under exemption 4.”). 
 74.   E.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Nat’l Insts. Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d 37, 
52 (D.D.C. 2002); accord 9 to 5 Org., 721 F.2d at 10. Some courts have adopted a “case by case” approach 
to identifying the government’s interests, leading to what the Justice Department admits are “sometimes 
conflicting” results. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 309 (2009). 
 75.   Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 931 F.2d 939, 947 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph, J., concurring) (quoting John C. Janka, Comment, Federal Disclosure 
Statutes and the Fifth Amendment: The New Status of Trade Secrets, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 334, 364 (1987)). 
 76.   See Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 
314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (holding that it was “well settled” that the fact that “documents are merely 
confidential does not protect them against compulsory disclosure”); Carrow, supra note 66, at 188. 
 77.   FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1966) (repealed 1970) (requiring the party seeking discovery to 
establish “good cause” for the disclosure). 
 78.   See Taubeneck & Sexton, supra note 58, at 491. 
 79.   8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2377 (3d ed. 1940) (“[W]here the Government needs 
information for the conduct of its functions, and the persons possessing the information need the 
encouragement of privacy in order to be induced to make full disclosure, the protection of a privilege 
should be accorded.”); see also Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (granting the 
privilege after concluding that the government’s ability to get truthful information “would be jeopardized” 
without assurances of confidentiality); cf. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 661 (D.C. 
Cir. 1960) (refusing to grant the privilege because “[t]he likelihood seems slight that in the future persons 
outside the Board . . . will avoid providing the Board with all information requested if production of 
documents is judicially ordered in this case”). 
 80.   See, e.g., FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 912-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (ordering the 
FCC to keep privately submitted trade evidence confidential because it related to “a highly competitive 
industry” and disclosure of it “might well do great if not irreparable harm to the respondents’ businesses”); 
see also FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 285 (1965) (upholding the FTC’s rule for reviewing evidence 
in camera when “disclosure would irreparably damage private, competitive interests”); 8 WIGMORE, supra 
note 79, § 2212 (discussing other protections for trade secrets). 
 81.   Machin, 316 F.2d at 339; accord Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572, 573 
(W.D. Ky. 1938) (withholding disclosure by recognizing the government’s interest in “the maintenance 
of efficient public service”); see also Note, Government Privilege Against Disclosure of Official 
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But these “interests” are untethered from Exemption 4. Whether a 
document was “confidential” was logically anterior to whether the government’s 
interests outweighed those of a private litigant. Pre-FOIA agencies deployed 
these interests in the “good cause” analysis to prevent litigants from receiving 
undisputedly confidential documents. FOIA’s use of “confidential” suggests that 
Exemption 4 implicates an antecedent issue to whether the government could 
assert a sufficiently strong interest. Exemption 4 is thus an outlier in FOIA that 
actually favors secrecy when compared to preexisting discovery doctrine. 
Tellingly, courts compensated in a pro-transparency direction with the National 
Parks test, suggesting that they preferenced pre-FOIA discovery rules over 
FOIA’s text. 
3. Exemption 7 and Records “Compiled for Law-Enforcement Purposes” 
Exemption 7 contains six sub-exemptions that each protect a category of 
law-enforcement information—for example, investigation techniques and the 
identity of confidential informants.82 But before an agency can invoke one of 
these sub-exemptions, it must first prove that the information was “compiled for 
law enforcement purposes.”83 Every circuit to reach the issue has conditioned its 
interpretation of this language on the type of agency involved, even though FOIA 
contains no such distinction. If an agency has mixed law-enforcement and 
administrative functions (e.g., the IRS), courts “scrutinize with some skepticism 
the particular purpose claimed.”84 But where an agency’s primary function is law 
enforcement (e.g., the FBI), some courts hold that the requirement does not apply 
at all (the per se test), while others require only a “rational nexus” between 
information and a claimed law-enforcement purpose (the rational nexus test). 
The First Circuit pioneered the idea of bifurcating Exemption 7’s threshold 
requirement in Irons v. Bell, where it adopted the per se test.85 Irons concluded 
that Exemption 7 could protect FBI records “lacking even a colorable claim to 
law enforcement purpose.”86 The court first made a passing attempt to reconcile 
its interpretation with FOIA, noting that the “character” of Exemption 7’s 
 
Documents, 58 YALE L.J. 993, 993 (1949) (describing the interaction of executive privilege and this 
interest). 
 82.   5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2018) (excluding “records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that [disclosure] (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere 
with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial 
adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, 
(D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . [or] information 
furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could 
reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual”). 
 83.   Id. 
 84.   Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 740 F.3d 
195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).  
 85.   596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 86.   Id. at 472. 
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subcategories “suggests” a distinction between agencies.87 It also referenced 
statements from individual congressmen emphasizing Exemption 7’s general 
breadth.88 But Irons offered nothing that suggested a distinction between 
“mixed” and “law enforcement” agencies, much less the per se test. Rather, the 
holding emerged from the “strong policy reasons” that Irons identified to support 
its decision, such as threats to personal privacy and the risk of reducing 
cooperation from government informants.89 As with the previous two case 
studies, other circuits cited Irons to adopt the per se test.90 
The first court to adopt the “rational nexus” test failed to offer any rationale. 
It instead cited Irons (presumably erroneously) for the proposition that law-
enforcement agencies need only provide a “‘rational nexus’ between 
enforcement of a federal law” and the disputed information.91 When the D.C. 
Circuit subsequently adopted the rational nexus test, it admitted that “FOIA 
makes no distinction on its face between agencies whose principal function is 
criminal law enforcement and agencies with both law enforcement and 
administrative functions.”92 But it reasoned that treating all agencies the same 
would be “unnecessarily wooden” and that “congressional purpose, common 
sense, and notions of judicial economy” justified its holding.93 Like Irons, it 
limited its analysis of “congressional purpose” to the general nature of 
documents covered under Exemption 7.94 
Both tests brought Exemption 7 closer to pre-FOIA law. Under its modern 
two-part framework, the exemption adopts many longstanding provisions that 
regulate criminal discovery. For example, Exemption 7(D) houses the well-
established “informant’s privilege,”95 while the discovery rules that have long 
protected internal investigatory files are reflected in Exemptions 7(A) and 7(E).96 
But as with Exemption 5, Congress added a predicate requirement—the 
 
 87.   Id. at 474. But the “law enforcement purposes” requirement predated Exemption 
7’s subsections. As originally enacted, the exemption protected “investigatory files compiled for law 
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7) (1970).  
 88.   596 F.2d at 474-75 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 17,034 (1974) (remarks of Sen. 
Kennedy)).  
 89.   Irons, 596 F.2d at 474. 
 90.   See Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2011); Jones v. 
FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1994); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 1980); see also 
Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1984) (adopting the test for different atextual reasons). 
 91.   Church of Scientology v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 92.   Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 93.   Id. 
 94.   See id. at 417-18 (reasoning that Exemption 7’s subsections “apply more 
extensively in criminal than in civil law enforcement”). 
 95.   See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 
535-36 (1895). 
 96.   See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) (1974) (qualifying that the federal rules of criminal 
procedure do not authorize discovery of “internal government documents . . . in connection with 
investigating or prosecuting the case”); see also Carrow, supra note 66, at 181-84 (discussing judicial 
privileges for “information obtained by investigation”).  
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information must have been “compiled for law enforcement purposes.”97 The per 
se test ignores this requirement, while the rational nexus test blunts it. Both limit 
the change that FOIA should have brought to information disclosure. 
4. FOIA’s De Novo Deference Regimes 
Despite a statutory mandate for de novo review,98 FOIA jurisprudence 
embraces several deference regimes to shield the assertions that agencies make 
to justify their invocation of exemptions. Because affidavits from agency 
officials are typically the only evidence in play at summary judgment—the 
government can prevent discovery and meet its summary judgment burden with 
an affidavit and index of its withholdings99—this deference is often dispositive 
and effectively abrogates FOIA’s command for de novo review.100 
To be fair, the original deference regime in FOIA—deference to agencies 
that invoke Exemption 1 to protect classified information101—was not solely the 
product of judicial creativity. It came from a conference committee report, which 
instructed courts to “accord substantial weight” to agency affidavits justifying 
Exemption 1 withholdings.102 Because early Exemption 1 cases arose during the 
“high point” of legislative history use,103 courts eagerly adopted this language as 
if it were statutory text.104  
But courts soon charted their own course. They quickly elevated Exemption 
1 deference to the near-absolute levels that they give to the executive’s national 
security decisions outside FOIA.105 Courts began to hold that they “must accept” 
 
 97.   5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2018). 
 98.   Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 99.   See infra Section I.B.5. 
 100.   See 1 O’REILLY, supra note 9, § 8:22, at 626 (“Courts have moved away from true 
‘de novo’ review.”); Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Information 
Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1208 (2004) (“Although purporting to apply de novo review, [courts] 
effectively apply something less.”). It is hard to see how FOIA’s deference regimes can be squared with 
de novo review. De novo review of agency action requires unimpaired “authority . . . to make factual 
determinations, and to apply those determinations to the law.” United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 
U.S. 380, 391 (1999). More broadly, the Supreme Court regularly contrasts deference with de novo 
review. See, e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1315 (2015) (“Congress 
has deviated from the usual practice of affording deference to the factfindings of an initial tribunal in 
affording de novo review of the TTAB’s decisions.”); BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 572 U.S. 25, 41 
(2014) (“Reviewing courts cannot review their decision de novo. Rather, they must do so with 
considerable deference.”). Imposing a blanket deference rule inhibits weighing evidence and assessing 
credibility. Moreover, because the affidavit is the only factual evidence required for an agency to receive 
summary judgment in FOIA, deferring to the affidavit is tantamount to deferring to the agency itself. 
 101.   See § 552(b)(1) (protecting records that are “(A) specifically authorized under 
criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign 
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order”). 
 102.   H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380 (Conf. Rep.) (1974), reprinted in 1 FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-1200) SOURCE BOOK, at 219, 229 (1975). 
 103.   See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 374. 
 104.   See, e.g., Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 105.   See infra note 297. 
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agency assertions that are “plausible and reasonable,”106 reasoning that they were 
“in no position to second-guess . . . the agency’s [classification] 
determination.”107 Modern courts simply examine whether the explanation 
“appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’”108 Regardless of formulation, this deference 
comes close to judicial abnegation—“little proof or explanation is required 
beyond a plausible assertion that the information is properly classified.”109 
Indeed, despite overseeing most Exemption 1 disputes, the D.C. Circuit has 
ordered disclosure only four times.110 
Courts have also extended deference to other exemptions. Some of these 
deference regimes are relatively loose, such as the “considerable” and 
“particular” deference agencies receive under Exemptions 4 and 5, 
respectively.111 Others are quite powerful. Consider the deference regime for 
law-enforcement information. In CNSS v. U.S. Department of Justice, the D.C. 
Circuit affirmed an agency’s decision to withhold unclassified information 
relating to 9/11 detainees under Exemption 7.112 Cautioning that the capabilities 
of America’s enemies were “beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore” and 
reiterating its “poor position to second-guess the executive’s judgment,” the 
court held that it owed Exemption-1-strength deference to Exemption 7 claims 
that implicate national security concerns, even when the responsive information 
is unclassified.113  
The D.C. Circuit later extended this deference to non-national-security 
matters, noting only that courts grant “deference to an agency’s predictive 
judgment of . . . harm.”114 The court’s sole support came from CNSS, even 
though the holding and analysis of that decision, which both hinged on national 
security issues, did not apply. Other courts have since cited this opinion to adopt 
general Exemption 7 deference.115 More broadly, some district courts have cited 
 
 106.   Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 107.   Stein v. Dep’t of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 108.   Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (first quoting Gardels, 689 F.2d 
at 1105; and then quoting Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
 109.   Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2007). FOIA’s statutory history 
further highlights the tension between FOIA’s text and this deference regime. Exemption 1’s modern 
language is the product of a congressional override of the Supreme Court’s prior attempt to avoid 
substantive review of classification decisions. See infra notes 272-280. 
 110.   See Susan Nevelow Mart & Tom Ginsburg, [Dis-]Informing the People’s 
Discretion: Judicial Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information 
Act, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 773 (2014). 
 111.   See, e.g., 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1983) (Exemption 4); Island Film, S.A. v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
869 F. Supp. 2d 123, 135 (D.D.C. 2012) (Exemption 5). 
 112.   331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 113.   Id. at 928. 
 114.   CREW v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 746 F.3d 1082, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Although, 
a few district courts recognized Exemption 7 deference prior to CNSS. See, e.g., Linn v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 92-cv-1406, 1995 WL 631847, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1995). 
 115.   See, e.g., Cable News Network, Inc. v. FBI, 293 F. Supp. 3d 59, 71 (D.D.C. 2018); 
Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. SEC, No. 3:14-CV-2197, 2016 WL 950995, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. 
Mar. 12, 2016). 
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Exemption 1 caselaw to hold that they must “respect the expertise of an agency” 
and not “overstep the proper limits of the judicial role in FOIA review” when 
considering any exemption.116 It is unclear how courts can reconcile this 
language with de novo review or the government’s burden of proof. 
Deference in FOIA draws heavily from corresponding judge-made 
deference regimes elsewhere in administrative law. In fact, the originating courts 
for many of FOIA’s deference regimes cited directly to these regimes.117 And as 
they did in FOIA, courts justified deference in traditional APA litigation by 
gesturing to institutional anxieties, recognizing that the “well-reasoned views of 
the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.’”118 Pre-FOIA courts raised similar concerns when evaluating the 
assertions that agencies made to justify executive privilege.119  
The decision to adopt these deference standards came notwithstanding 
FOIA’s displacement of that same common law. The statute’s demands for de 
novo review, for the government to hold the burden of justifying withholdings, 
and for courts to construe exemptions narrowly appear to preclude formalized 
deference regimes. And yet deference exists, just as it does outside FOIA. 
5. Burden Placement 
FOIA imposes a presumption in favor of disclosure and places the burden 
of proof on the government.120 While courts often acknowledge both 
requirements, they employ a standard that effectively shifts the burden to 
requesters: (1) An agency can meet its burden by providing a sufficiently specific 
explanation, typically in the form of a simple affidavit and an index of withheld 
information. (2) The burden then shifts to plaintiffs, who must produce specific 
evidence to materially dispute the government’s allegations. While variations of 
this framework can be found across FOIA—for example, in the standards for 
initiating discovery,121 recommending sanctions,122 assessing the adequacy of an 
 
 116.   See Parker v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 238 F. Supp. 3d 89, 98 (D.D.C. 
2017) (quoting Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, 160 F. Supp. 3d 285, 293 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Hayden, 608 F.2d at 1388). 
 117.   See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 600 F. Supp. 
114, 118 (D.D.C. 1984) (first citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984); and then citing Women’s 
Equity Action League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office 
Workers v. Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that the “regular 
confines of administrative law” require “considerable” deference in Exemption 4 cases). 
 118.   Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 119.   See Taubeneck & Sexton, supra note 58, at 500. 
 120.   5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2018). A narrow exception to this framework exists for 
agency assertions concerning the technical feasibility of reproducing documents. See id. 
 121.   See infra note 182. 
 122.   See infra note 350 and accompanying text. 
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agency’s search for responsive documents,123 and determining whether a search 
request creates an undue burden124—it originated in summary judgment 
disputes.125 Tellingly, the burden-shifting mechanism substantially mirrors 
existing practices in general APA litigation.126  
The standard’s two prongs developed separately. The government’s burden 
evolved from pre-FOIA disputes over its privilege claims.127 Shortly before 
Congress enacted FOIA, the Supreme Court adopted a deferential posture to 
these claims. In United States v. Reynolds, it held that courts should look to the 
“evidence and circumstances” surrounding the government’s privilege claims 
rather than examine the disputed evidence directly.128 Courts justified this 
decision as a “matter of comity.”129 The Supreme Court later transported this 
doctrine to FOIA, citing Reynolds to hold that agencies can establish that an 
exemption applies “by means of detailed affidavits or oral testimony” rather than 
in camera review.130 In its canonical Vaughn v. Rosen opinion, the D.C. Circuit 
“expanded” on this opinion by dropping the oral testimony option and 
establishing two requirements for summary judgment: (1) an affidavit explaining 
the reasoning behind the redactions and (2) where necessary, an index of the 
government’s withholdings.131 One judge later appeared to admit Vaughn’s 
common law nature, observing that its holding was a “creative solution[] to the 
problems associated with de novo review of refusals to disclose information.”132  
Courts adopted the “presumption of regularity” for the requester’s burden. 
A well-established standard for assessing challenges to the government’s 
execution of the law, the presumption mandates that “in the absence of clear 
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [public officials] have properly 
discharged their official duties.”133 As they did with Reynolds, courts rooted the 
 
 123.   See Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“In 
demonstrating the adequacy of the search, the agency may rely upon reasonably detailed, nonconclusory 
affidavits submitted in good faith.”). 
 124.   See, e.g., Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (accepting an agency’s assertions as to the burden of a particular search); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 
339, 369-71 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (requiring the plaintiff to marshal evidence without discovery to challenge 
an agency’s assertions regarding search burdens). 
 125.   See Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Summary 
judgment is warranted on the basis of agency affidavits when the affidavits describe the justifications for 
nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls 
within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by 
evidence of agency bad faith.” (quoting Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
 126.   See infra note 182. 
 127.   For more on pre-FOIA government secrecy, see infra Section III.A. 
 128.   345 U.S. 1, 9 (1953). 
 129.   See NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 130.   EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973), superseded on other grounds by statute, 
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.  
 131.   484 F.2d 820, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 132.   Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring). 
 133.   United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); accord Bank of the 
U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 69-70 (1827). 
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presumption in “a due respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government.”134 
The first appellate court to adopt this presumption in FOIA cited pre-APA 
common law without discussion to hold that plaintiffs needed either “affirmative 
proof” of agency bad faith or contrary information to successfully contest agency 
affidavits.135 Not only did the presumption raise the bar for plaintiff challenges 
to agency affidavits, it also relieved agencies from having to produce 
circumstantial information to support their affidavit.136 Courts universally 
adopted this presumption, agreeing that affidavits enjoy “a presumption of good 
faith” that can withstand a plaintiff’s allegations.137 The Supreme Court 
eventually embraced this reasoning, although it qualified that the presumption 
was “less stringent” in the FOIA context.138 
Both the Reynolds evidentiary standard and the presumption of regularity 
were themselves departures from ordinary course, resting on express principles 
of deference to the executive branch. Accepting government assertions at face 
value while requiring plaintiffs to produce specific evidence is thus 
unsurprisingly in sharp tension with FOIA’s general presumption in favor of 
disclosure and the government’s burden of proof. But as with other areas of 
FOIA’s common law, the standard comports neatly with pre-FOIA common law 
and existing APA doctrine, which ultimately prevailed. 
II. Connecting FOIA’s Common Law to FOIA’s Outcomes 
As Part I discussed, FOIA’s common law forms much of the doctrine that 
governs FOIA litigation. This Part links this conclusion to FOIA’s modern pro-
agency results. It identifies three major pressure points in the statute’s doctrinal 
development that create overwhelmingly pro-government outcomes. It then 
concludes by examining the methodological forces that maintain FOIA’s 
common law in an increasingly textualist judiciary. 
A. Defaulting to a Preexisting Equilibrium 
FOIA’s substantive tensions stem from the near-exclusive control that 
agencies held over their records before FOIA’s enactment.139 The public had no 
meaningful right to information outside of narrow affirmative disclosure 
 
 134.   Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879). According to one pre-APA 
commentator, this presumption created “room for a de facto if not a de jure immunity from judicial 
review.” Nathan Isaacs, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings, 30 YALE L.J. 781, 788 (1921). 
 135.   Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing United 
States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14 (1926)). 
 136.   Colby, 509 F.2d at 1369. 
 137.   E.g., Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 
692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 138.   See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004). 
 139.   Of course, Congress could subpoena agency records. See Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). 
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requirements.140 The APA’s public disclosure section ostensibly required 
agencies to provide matters of official record on request. But it lacked a judicial 
review provision, required that requesters be “properly and directly concerned” 
with the relevant information, and enabled agencies to withhold information if 
they had “good cause.”141 These provisions effectively gave agencies unfettered 
discretion to withhold information.142 As the Supreme Court would later quip, 
the APA’s public disclosure section “came to be looked upon more as a 
withholding statute than a disclosure statute.”143 
Litigants who tried to subpoena government information in discovery fared 
only a little better. Agency officials who refused to testify or produce agency 
records were immune from contempt proceedings.144 Although, this shield was 
less useful when the government itself was a party in litigation. In those 
situations, courts could encourage disclosure though other means, such as by 
dismissing the government’s case or making adverse findings of fact.145 To avoid 
these outcomes, agencies that wanted to maintain secrecy fell back on various 
facets of executive privilege, which protected sensitive information like state 
secrets and internal agency communications.146 
FOIA should have circumvented this jurisprudence. It prevented the 
executive from accepting adverse findings or the dismissal of its case to protect 
records from public disclosure. It instead made courts the final arbiters over 
information disclosure, instructing them to enforce a presumption of open access 
to government records. 
To be sure, Congress sensibly converted many agency defenses into 
exemptions.147 For example, it enshrined the attorney-client privilege in 
Exemption 5, the investigation and informant privileges in Exemption 7, and the 
state-secrets privilege for classified information in Exemption 1.148 But Congress 
restricted many of these protections—for example, limiting Exemption 5 to 
 
 140.   The public had no general right of access to government information at common 
law. See CROSS, supra note 58, at 25; see also David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 
YALE L.J. 100, 107-15 (2018) (discussing pre-FOIA transparency jurisprudence). Individuals could 
inspect public records only when they made a showing of necessity and the government found that 
disclosure would not be detrimental to the public. CROSS, supra note 58, at 29. 
 141.   5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964). Agencies almost always found good cause. Two notable 
examples were “the contents of telephone books” and “the guest list for a private pleasure trip on a Navy 
Yacht by the Secretary of the Navy.” Note, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Section 3 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 417, 436 (1965). 
 142.   See CROSS, supra note 58, at 228.  
 143.   EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).   
 144.   To receive immunity, an official only needed to point to a regulation or a superior’s 
order that required them to withhold disclosure. See U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 469-70 
(1951); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900). 
 145.   See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513, 519 (8th Cir. 1958) (affirming the trial 
court’s dismissal of the government’s case). 
 146.   See Carrow, supra note 66, at 176-91. 
 147.   See Sam Lebovic, How Administrative Opposition Shaped the Freedom of 
Information Act, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 17, at 13. 
 148.   See supra Section I.B. 
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“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums” and Exemption 7 to information 
“compiled for law enforcement purposes.”149 It also situated these exemptions 
within an otherwise pro-disclosure framework. So while FOIA contained some 
similarities to established doctrine, it still represented a major structural and 
doctrinal shift toward transparency. 
The judiciary elided the differences between FOIA’s commands and pre-
FOIA common law through a crabbed perception of what FOIA changed. Courts 
of course did not resist FOIA across the board. For example, they had no problem 
acknowledging that “any person” had a right to bring a FOIA claim, not just 
those who were “properly and directly concerned” with the relevant 
information.150 And with a few exceptions, they agreed that agencies could no 
longer withhold information simply on “good cause” and had to fit their claims 
within FOIA’s exemptions.151 
But courts never fully recognized FOIA’s substantive departures from other 
areas of administrative law and civil discovery. This disconnect is most 
prominent when comparing pre-FOIA privileges to FOIA’s exemptions. Courts 
abrogated many of FOIA’s additional requirements by adopting pre-FOIA 
doctrines wholesale at the expense of FOIA’s text—for example defining “inter-
agency or intra-agency” to include third parties.152 More explicitly, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that “[t]he primary purpose of the FOIA was not to benefit 
private litigants or to serve as a substitute for civil discovery,”153 which set a 
ceiling on FOIA’s disclosure mandate that cannot be found in FOIA’s 
exemptions.154  
 
 149.   See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (7) (2018). 
 150.   Compare id. § 552(a)(3)(A), with 5 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1964); see also U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (“[T]he identity of the 
requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her FOIA request.”). 
 151.   See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (noting that FOIA’s exemptions are 
“explicitly made exclusive”). Still, courts only reached this conclusion after a protracted debate. Some 
courts initially held that FOIA gave them a “broad equitable power to decline to order release when 
disclosure would damage the public interest.” See Rose v. Dep’t of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 & n.23 
(2d Cir. 1974) (collecting cases and discussing a circuit split on the issue). Other circuits concluded that 
equitable discretion might exist in “exceptional circumstances.” E.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 
1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971). On rare occasions, courts denied disclosure on these principles. See, e.g., Caplan 
v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 445 F. Supp. 699, 705-706 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 587 F.2d 544 
(2d Cir. 1978). The last court to reject this approach did so thirty years after FOIA’s enactment. See 
Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1082, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 152.   See supra Section I.B.1. 
 153.   Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n.14 (1982). 
 154.   There are of course policy considerations weighing against allowing FOIA to 
conflict with discovery. See Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery 
Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119, 194-200 (1984). But FOIA’s text does not support such a limit. See 
§ 552(d) (requiring that exceptions to disclosure be “specifically stated” in the statute). Indeed, Congress 
has amended FOIA when it wanted to stop the use of FOIA as an end run around discovery. See, e.g., 3 
O’REILLY, supra note 12, § 17:1, at 6-7 (noting that public outcry against a gang member’s use of FOIA 
to discover law enforcement information spurred the 1987 amendments to Exemption 7 (citing Freedom 
of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, §§ 1802-03, 100 Stat. 3207-48 to -49)). 
And yet, courts have relied on Baldridge to restrict disclosure. See, e.g., Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t 
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Courts also embraced general administrative common law doctrines that sit 
in tension with FOIA. Consider the judiciary’s decision to require that plaintiffs 
provide specific evidence to contest unsupported statements by the 
government.155 This framework creates a Catch-22 in FOIA. Plaintiffs must 
provide specific evidence to rebut an agency’s affidavit and get discovery, but 
because the agency controls the information, plaintiffs need discovery to find 
specific evidence. Challenges to agency denials of FOIA requests thus often 
become unviable. 
The ultimate product is a pro-government jurisprudence out of step with 
FOIA as a statute. Outside of a few exceptions, pre-FOIA secrecy doctrines gave 
the executive branch broad latitude to keep information from the public. FOIA’s 
attempt to impose additional requirements, reduce deference, and generally shift 
decision-making power to the judiciary disrupted—and aimed to disrupt—this 
preexisting equilibrium. Maintaining pre-FOIA jurisprudence blunted its effect. 
B. Relying on One-Sided Balancing 
FOIA doctrine also reflects subtler procedural tensions between FOIA’s 
requirements and the preexisting discovery procedures that courts imported. 
Recall the judiciary’s deferential posture toward the government’s privilege 
claims: looking to the “evidence and circumstances” surrounding a claim rather 
than the potentially privileged records themselves.156 Courts further caveated this 
analysis with a quasi-balancing test similar to the “good cause” analysis they 
used in other areas of civil discovery.157 When the government asserted a 
privilege, courts required the party seeking information to make a “showing of 
necessity” for the information, which would “determine how far the court should 
probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege [was] 
appropriate.”158 The Supreme Court would later frame these privilege disputes 
as balancing a litigant’s need for the information against the “public interest in 
protecting the flow of information.”159 
FOIA attempted to replace this amorphous balancing with clear rules. As 
one agency official complained, it was a “simple, self-executing word 
formula”160 that allowed agencies to withhold information only as “specifically 
stated” in nine discrete, exclusive exemptions.161 But courts still appear to tacitly 
 
of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 287-88 (4th Cir. 2010) (invoking this admonition to adopt an atextual 
interpretation of Exemption 5). 
 155.   See supra Section I.B.4. 
 156.   United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9 (1953). 
 157.   See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 158.   Id. at 11; see also Taubeneck & Sexton, supra note 58, at 509 (elaborating on this 
balancing process). 
 159.   Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). 
 160.   See Lebovic, supra note 147, at 27 (quoting Memorandum from Leon Ulman, 
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, to Bill Moyers (Mar. 16, 1966)).  
 161.   5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (2018). 
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follow the “balancing” approach in FOIA litigation.162 And critically, the balance 
is broken under FOIA’s framework. On one side, agencies are well represented. 
Courts consider proxies for their interests, such as the “purposes” underlying 
FOIA’s exemptions or more baldly the government’s “special need[s].”163 
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit admitted in an Exemption 2 case that its “willingness to 
sanction a weak relation to [the exemption] may be greatest when the asserted 
government interest is relatively weighty.”164 These interests are buttressed by 
the deference regimes that courts took from other areas of administrative law and 
civil discovery, which empower an agency’s assessment of its own interests. 
Conversely, courts place little weight on the interests of FOIA’s plaintiffs. 
Traditional pre-FOIA discovery disputes involved agency adjudications and 
prosecutions against individuals, which implicated critical due process concerns. 
But FOIA disavows any interest in an individual requester’s motivations.165 It 
instead offers the amorphous “right of the public to information.”166 This “right” 
apparently does not implicate a meaningful “showing of necessity.” At common 
law, “disclosure” reflected a private interest in information that courts balanced 
against the “public interest in protecting the flow of information.”167 By 
reframing disclosure as a public interest, FOIA converted this private right of 
access into a public right to transparency,168 a major doctrinal shift that courts 
have implicitly rejected.  
To be sure, many opinions give lip service to FOIA’s goal of disclosure and 
narrow construction of exemptions.169 But once these platitudes are issued, they 
do not reappear.170 As one dissenting Justice put it, courts treat these provisions 
 
 162.   Courts openly conceptualize some of FOIA’s exemptions as balancing tests. See, 
e.g., Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(framing the National Parks test as balancing the public’s interest in disclosure against the government’s 
interests in keeping information confidential).  
 163.   Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 164.   Schwaner v. Dep’t of Air Force, 898 F.2d 793, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 165.   See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
771 (1989). 
 166.   Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 250 (July 4, 1966). 
 167.   Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (emphasis added); see also 
CROSS, supra note 58, at 29 (discussing the adversarial positions that “disclosure” and “public interest” 
took at common law). 
 168.   See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 2(1)(6), 121 Stat. 
2524, 2524 (asserting that FOIA ensures that transparency is not based “upon the ‘need to know’ but upon 
the fundamental ‘right to know’”). 
 169.   See, e.g., supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
 170.   This recalcitrance to recognize transparency as a new “value” dovetails with the 
judiciary’s approach to areas in which it arguably is authorized to exercise discretion. Consider Exemption 
6, which exempts “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute 
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2018). While the exemption 
invites judicial balancing between privacy interests and the public interest in disclosure, the Supreme 
Court has limited the public interest to FOIA’s “basic purpose,” which is “to open [federal] agency action 
to the light of public scrutiny.” Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 
425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)). Further, litigants have the burden of establishing that “the public interest 
sought to be advanced is a significant one.” Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 
172 (2004). Under the former barrier, areas of clear public interest, such as discovering wrongdoing in 
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as “a formula to be recited rather than a principle to be followed.”171 The same 
courts that look to the government’s “needs” when construing exemptions reject 
arguments that suggest they consider pro-disclosure values, reasoning that it is 
not their role to “balance the public interest in disclosure.”172 Except in isolated 
areas where FOIA calls for it, a litigant cannot “bolster the case for disclosure 
by claiming an additional public benefit” from disclosure.173 This conclusion is 
of course in line with FOIA’s attempt to shift disputes away from balancing. But 
it exacerbates the problem of courts considering the government’s “interests” 
beyond those that FOIA’s exemptions protect. 
As a procedural matter, then, much of FOIA’s impotence can be attributed 
to its poor fit with the discovery and administrative procedures that courts grafted 
onto FOIA disputes. Congress designed FOIA to circumvent judicial balancing. 
The judiciary’s tacit decision to maintain the old system created a lopsided 
framework where well-established government interests transferred seamlessly, 
overpowering the unfamiliar transparency values that FOIA sought to empower. 
C. Recreating the Appellate Review Model 
One of administrative common law’s longstanding features is its expansion 
of the “appellate review model.” Under the model, courts limit their review to 
the record that was originally before an agency and the reasoning that the agency 
used when making its decision.174 If either the agency record or reasoning is 
insufficient, the reviewing court will remand to the agency for the development 
of a new record.175 On a practical level, this model is responsible for many 
 
state or foreign governments, lack public interest for FOIA purposes. See, e.g., Garcia v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 181 F. Supp. 2d 356, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The discovery of wrongdoing at a state as opposed 
to a federal agency . . . is not a goal of FOIA.”). And the latter barrier enables the government to redact 
up to the line at which the public interest in withheld information would become significant. See, e.g., 
Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178 (1991) (holding that the public’s legitimate interest in documents 
had been “adequately served” by the partial release of other documents). 
 171.   See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 161 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 172.   Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1074 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
 173.   Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
Even where FOIA calls for considering the public interest—such as in the Exemption 6 context, see supra 
note 170—courts favor secrecy. The Supreme Court has emphasized that privacy interests in the FOIA 
context cannot be viewed in “some limited or ‘cramped notion.’” Favish, 541 U.S. at 165 (quoting 
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763). Lower courts have defined privacy broadly to include interests that 
are not “patent or obvious,” Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 591 F.2d 808, 809 
(D.C. Cir. 1978), and those that are “derivative.” Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 
873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 174.   See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 941 (2011); see also SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged 
are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.”); Christopher J. Walker, Against 
Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 106, 114 (2017) (observing that 
Chenery reformed the appellate model to adjust for separation-of-powers concerns). 
 175.   See Merrill, supra note 174, at 941. 
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foundational administrative common law doctrines.176 For example, courts 
reviewing agency action under the APA adopt presumptions in favor of summary 
judgment and against discovery, reasoning that factfinding is better left to 
agencies.177 They also adopt a strong presumption in favor of reviewing and 
potentially remanding agency decisions, but they will only order affirmative 
agency action in rare, narrow circumstances.178 
FOIA is incompatible with much of this model. The statute tasks courts 
with reviewing an agency’s decision de novo and gives them jurisdiction to 
affirmatively order production of wrongly withheld records.179 Courts thus 
rightly hold that agencies act as traditional litigants, freeing them of the (often 
unstated) grounds on which their officials relied when rejecting a FOIA request. 
Agencies instead can raise new arguments and submit new “evidence” 
(affidavits) in litigation.180 
But courts still employ a quasi-appellate-review model that simply 
incorporates these pro-government concessions. They functionally limit FOIA 
litigation to the equivalent of an agency record—the agency’s affidavit and any 
redacted documents responsive to the underlying request. As noted, courts will 
deny discovery, discount plaintiff evidence, and grant summary judgment if this 
“record” meets its deferential bar.181 Relatedly, courts have imported 
administrative common law’s strong presumptions in favor of summary 
judgment and against discovery to FOIA.182 These presumptions reinforce the 
centrality of the “record” by preventing plaintiffs from presenting an alternative 
view, investigating the government’s response, or challenging the veracity of an 
agency’s affidavit.183 Finally, courts engage in the near-ubiquitous practice of 
 
 176.   See id. (“[T]he great preponderance of what we today regard as administrative law 
. . . consists of an elaboration of the implications of the appellate review model.”). 
 177.   See, e.g., Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 133 F.3d 1, 7 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that discovery in APA cases is inappropriate “except when there has been a 
‘strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior’ or when the record is so bare that it prevents effective 
judicial review” (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971))); 
Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d 67, 94 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that 
“[s]ummary judgment is the proper mechanism” for adjudicating APA claims and that “the typical 
summary judgment standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 are not applicable”). 
 178.   Compare Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (recognizing a strong 
presumption in favor of judicial review), with Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (establishing 
a strong presumption against judicial review of agency decisions to not take action). 
 179.   5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2018). 
 180.    Louis v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2005); Young v. 
CIA, 972 F.2d 536, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 181.   See supra Section I.B.5. 
 182.   See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 
1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Generally, FOIA cases should be handled on motions for summary judgment, 
once the documents in issue are properly identified.” (quoting Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th 
Cir. 1993))); Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 473 F.3d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that discovery in FOIA “should be denied where an agency’s declarations are reasonably 
detailed, submitted in good faith and the court is satisfied that no factual dispute remains” (quoting 
Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 217 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2002))). 
 183.   See Kwoka, supra note 9, at 230-31. 
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giving the government multiple attempts at summary judgment in lieu of setting 
a FOIA case for trial.184 These “do-overs” are functionally similar to remands in 
traditional APA litigation, where the government gets a second chance to make 
and defend its decision. The only difference is that an agency’s lawyers, rather 
than officials, craft the new justification.185 But that distinction is functionally 
immaterial to courts and opposing litigants. 
The combined effect of these holdings is an appellate model of review 
supercharged in the government’s favor. Agencies receive many of the model’s 
benefits, including control over the development of the litigation record and 
authority over when and how they take action. But they suffer none of its costs. 
Agencies can raise new arguments in litigation, even between rounds of 
summary judgment. And FOIA’s version of “remands”—new summary 
judgment briefings—does not demand the resources that agency reconsideration 
otherwise requires, as lawyers can simply draft new affidavits to support new 
arguments.186 This framework ensures that agencies remain in control 
throughout litigation despite FOIA’s unique provisions otherwise. 
D. Surviving the Textualist Wave 
The modern existence of FOIA’s common law raises an additional tension. 
As federal common law has substantially narrowed and text has risen as the 
primary focus of statutory interpretation,187 FOIA’s common law persists. 
Indeed, it has thrived. For example, FOIA’s deference regimes have expanded 
substantially over the past two decades.188 
Equally consequential and perhaps more telling has been the modern 
Supreme Court’s response to FOIA’s common law. The Court has heard four 
FOIA cases over the past two decades. Two are of limited relevance. They 
considered FOIA’s personal privacy exemptions, which arguably authorize 
common-law-like judicial balancing.189 But the other two cases did address 
FOIA’s common law. And they reveal a clear struggle between textualism and 
the common law. In both, the Court used textualist reasoning to challenge the 
 
 184.   See id. at 231-35. 
 185.   See Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73 MD. L. REV. 1060, 
1085 (2014). 
 186.   See id. 
 187.   See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113-14. 
 188.   See, e.g., Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(adopting the per se test for Exemption 7’s “law enforcement purposes” requirement); see also supra 
Section I.B.3 (discussing the per se test). 
 189.   The first case addressed Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), which exempts 
from disclosure law-enforcement records that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.” See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) 
(broadly construing the exemption). The second case rejected the Third Circuit’s holding that corporations 
could raise Exemption 6, FOIA’s other “personal privacy” exemption. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 
397 (2011); see also supra note 170 (discussing Exemption 6). 
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common law approach of lower courts. But it simultaneously issued decisions 
that effectively maintained the status quo. 
The first case, U.S. Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users 
Protective Ass’n,190 considered the “consultant corollary”—the judge-made 
doctrine that extends Exemption 5 to records that outside parties create, 
notwithstanding the exemption’s limit to “inter-agency or intra-agency” 
records.191 Criticizing the interpretation, Klamath’s unanimous majority 
observed the “apparent plainness” of the statutory text, which was “underscored” 
by a statutory definition of “agency” that did not include outside entities.192 The 
Court opined that the interpretation made “intra-agency” a “purely conclusory 
term” and warned that there was “no textual justification for draining the first 
condition of independent vitality.”193 
But the Court stopped short of rejecting the doctrine. Disclaiming any 
views on whether third-party information could receive Exemption 5 protection, 
it held only that the exemption did not apply to information submitted by parties 
that have an interest in a related administrative proceeding.194 This result is odd. 
While narrow Supreme Court opinions are not unusual, the “interested party” 
distinction is not located anywhere in FOIA. Regardless, lower courts took the 
hint. Only one has limited Exemption 5 to government agencies.195 Every other 
circuit to reach the issue has construed Klamath as a narrow exception to their 
preexisting holdings, declining to address the challenges raised by its 
reasoning.196 One has gone further, adding an exception to the Klamath 
exception.197 Even judges who opposed reading “inter-agency or intra-agency” 
as including third parties saw “little point in . . . spending more time on the issue” 
because of Klamath’s narrowness.198 
The second case concerned Exemption 2, which exempts information 
“related solely to internal personnel rules and practices.”199 Lower courts had for 
decades construed the exemption as protecting records when “disclosure would 
risk circumvention of the law,”200 a flatly atextual reading they labeled “High 2.” 
 
 190.   532 U.S. 1, 9 (2001). 
 191.   See supra Section II.A.1. 
 192.   Klamath, 532 U.S. at 9. 
 193.   Id. at 12. 
 194.   Id. at 12-13. 
 195.   See Lucaj v. FBI, 852 F.3d 541, 549 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 196.   See, e.g., Stewart v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(exempting consultant records and reasoning that a holding to the contrary would “impinge on agency 
discretion to seek advice”); Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 512 F.3d 677, 681 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (finding that its previous cases “compel[led]” it to continue exempting third-party documents). 
 197.   See Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 277-78 (4th Cir. 
2010) (holding that Klamath did not apply when a submitter’s interests mirrored an agency’s interests).  
 198.   Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 06-5242, 2008 WL 
1990366, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2008) (Tatel, J., concurring in denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
 199.   5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2018). 
 200.   Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1073 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
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Early opinions invoking High 2 either relied entirely on policy-based 
reasoning201 or openly admitted to rewriting FOIA to be “consonant with 
reasonableness” and “common sense.”202 Over its four-decade existence, High 2 
expanded as the equities demanded.203 It eventually reached entirely civilian 
matters, such as rubrics for evaluating job applicants204 and blueprints to a 
federal research campus.205 
High 2 finally reached the Supreme Court in Milner v. Department of the 
Navy, where an eight-member majority castigated the interpretation and refused 
to take its underlying reasoning “seriously.”206 The Milner Court observed that 
“the only way to arrive at High 2 [was] by taking a red pen to the statute—
‘cutting out some’ words and ‘pasting in others’ until little of the actual provision 
remains.”207 It came close to acknowledging High 2’s common law origins, 
stating that the doctrine arose out of the feeling “certain sensitive information 
should be exempt from disclosure.”208 
But the common law’s pull prevailed. The Court could not help but 
“recognize the strength of the [government’s] interest in protecting” its 
records.209 Unprompted, it discussed the “other tools at hand to shield . . . 
sensitive materials,” listing three unraised exemptions.210 Although the Court did 
not issue a holding on these exemptions, lower courts did. Several seized on 
Milner’s language and expanded other exemptions to incorporate affected 
records, heavily cabining Milner’s practical impact.211 
Of course, Klamath and Milner do not necessarily mean that the Supreme 
Court will always avoid major FOIA decisions. The Court has granted certiorari 
 
 201.   The first court to reach the High 2 holding offered only that disclosure “would be 
comparable to requiring one football team to give its ‘play-book’ to the opposing team before a game.” 
Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504, 506 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 202.   Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1056, 1074. 
 203.   Rulings under Exemption 2 were often contradictory. For example, courts held 
that disclosing the FBI’s file numbering system might compromise its investigatory techniques, Coleman 
v. FBI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D.D.C. 1998), but that disclosing the Secret Service’s file numbering system 
held no such threat, Fitzgibbon v. U.S. Secret Serv., 747 F. Supp. 51, 57 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 204.   Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. U.S. Customs Serv., 802 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 205.   Elliott v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 596 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 206.   562 U.S. 562, 574 n.6 (2011). 
 207.   Id. at 573 (quoting Elliott, 596 F.3d at 845). 
 208.   Id. at 580.   
 209.   Id. 
 210.   Id. 
 211.   Notably, multiple circuits counterbalanced Milner by weakening Exemption 7’s 
“law enforcement purposes” provision, see supra Section I.B.3, to require only that agencies prove some 
amorphous connection to “security.” See, e.g., ACLU v. FBI, 881 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2018); Pub. 
Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2011); see also, e.g., Raher v. Fed. Bureau 
of Prisons, No. CV-09-526, 2011 WL 2014875, at *11 (D. Or. May 24, 2011) (holding that the Bureau of 
Prisons compiled its housing contract policies for law-enforcement purposes). Agencies quickly took 
advantage of these decisions. As Exemption 2’s popularity plunged, their use of Exemption 7 increased 
dramatically. See Max Galka, Transparent Censorship: An In-Depth Look at FOIA in 2015, FOIA 
MAPPER (Apr. 11, 2016), https://foiamapper.com/annual-foia-reports-2015 [https://perma.cc/59F5-
CLEK]. 
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to review Exemption 4’s National Parks test212 and has signaled that it might 
make a larger decision there.213 But such a result, however welcomed by 
textualists, would likely not be the start of a broader trend if the APA is any 
guide. Both FOIA and the APA embody what Gillian Metzger calls a “pattern of 
judicial common law development punctuated by periodic resistance.”214 While 
threatened, Chevron remains at the center of APA litigation.215 Many other non-
statutory doctrines, such as extensive rulemaking requirements, also play central 
roles in administrative proceedings.216 As with FOIA, the Supreme Court 
occasionally challenges administrative common law in the APA, but more often 
allows its development in lower courts.217 Most famously, the Supreme Court 
declared in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC that the APA 
imposed the “maximum procedural requirements” that courts could demand of 
agencies.218 But as Metzger notes, “Vermont Yankee has not prevented 
substantial judicial expansion of § 553’s minimal procedural demands.”219 More 
recent decisions are similarly limited.220 
The rise of textualism suggests that courts would gradually challenge 
administrative common law doctrines, either by recognizing them as untenable 
or reacting to new legislation and Supreme Court holdings. But while some 
commentators have claimed that the Court’s recent decisions represent a broader 
shift away from administrative common law,221 the dominant view is that the 
 
 212.   Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 915, 915 (2019) (mem.) 
(granting certiorari); see also supra Section I.B (discussing the National Parks test). 
 213.   See Bernard Bell, Oh SNAP: The Battle Over “Food Stamp” Redemption Data 
that May Radically Reshape FOIA Exemption 4 (Part I), 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 
6, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/oh-snap-the-battle-over-food-stamp-redemption-data-that-may-
radically-reshape-foia-exemption-4-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/K7P6-DYVK]; see also N.H. Right to Life 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 383, 384-85 (2015) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) (criticizing National Parks and listing interpretive inconsistencies among 
the lower courts). 
 214.   Metzger, supra note 22, at 1305.  
 215.   See Brinkerhoff & Listwa, supra note 21, at 146-49. 
 216.   See, e.g., Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary 
Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 532-45 (2018) (arguing that many rulemaking requirements are 
improper administrative common law); see also Alec Webley, Seeing Through a Preamble, Darkly: 
Administrative Verbosity in an Age of Populism and “Fake News”, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 13-21 (2018) 
(discussing the preamble requirement’s common law development). 
 217.   For example, the Court overturned decades of common law surrounding 
exhaustion in Darby v. Cisneros by referencing statutory language that courts had “almost completely 
ignored.” 509 U.S. 137, 145 (1993). However, the statutory demand was minimal, mandating only that 
agencies promulgate a rule that stays their decisions during internal appeals. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018). Like 
Milner, this holding was largely toothless and “did not set off a movement toward statutory administrative 
law.” Beerman, supra note 22, at 29; see also Kathryn E. Kovacs, Pixelating Administrative Common 
Law in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 125 YALE L.J. F. 31 (2015) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s tendency to implicitly preserve administrative common law). 
 218.   435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
 219.   Metzger, supra note 22, at 1305.   
 220.   See Beerman, supra note 22, at 29. 
 221.   See Duffy, supra note 25, at 120; Sam Kalen, The Death of Administrative 
Common Law or the Rise of the Administrative Procedure Act, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 605, 605 (2016). 
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method is still thriving.222 In both FOIA and the rest of the APA, courts tacitly 
maintain the common law.  
III. Some Implications of FOIA’s Common Law 
Viewing FOIA’s modern jurisprudence as a subset of administrative 
common law provides an explanation for the gap between FOIA’s generally pro-
disclosure text and its pro-government outcomes. FOIA’s common law also 
holds broader implications for debates over both transparency and administrative 
common law. This Part explores four of them. It first leverages the administrative 
common law debate to critique FOIA doctrine. It then explores the role that well-
entrenched precedent and the gravitational pull of the APA have played in the 
development of FOIA doctrine. It next examines how Congress could overcome 
the inertial force of administrative common law. Finally, it takes advantage of 
the active involvement of both Congress and the judiciary in FOIA to critique 
foundational assumptions within the larger administrative common law debate. 
A. A Methodological Critique of FOIA Doctrine 
Framing FOIA jurisprudence as an extension of administrative common 
law provides a firm baseline for assessing its legitimacy. Commentators have 
long debated administrative common law’s propriety, developing a robust body 
of justifications and critiques.223 Unsurprisingly, the arguments of administrative 
common law’s critics apply with equal force to FOIA. For instance, if 
administrative common law is an unconstitutional aggregation of policymaking 
power in the judiciary,224 then so is FOIA’s common law. But curiously, the 
arguments of administrative common law’s defenders do not easily map onto 
FOIA’s common law. Even under their interpretive framework, FOIA is not an 
appropriate forum for federal common law. To this end, the balance of this 
Section considers FOIA’s common law in relation to the four major justifications 
for administrative common law that its proponents have offered.  
 
 222.   See, e.g., Beerman, supra note 22, at 29; Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten 
Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1215, 1244-47 (2014); Metzger, supra note 22, at 1305. 
 223.   Compare Duffy, supra note 25 (contending that statutory fidelity trumps 
administrative common law), and Kovacs, supra note 23 (arguing that administrative common law is 
illegitimate insofar as it conflicts with or ignores the APA), with Bremer, supra note 222 (contending that 
administrative common law ensures that constitutional values apply to the administrative state), and 
Metzger, supra note 22 (framing administrative common law as a justifiable area of federal common law). 
 224.   See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 1285, 1320 (2014); Duffy, supra note 25, at 161; see also Merrill, supra note 23, at 23 
(“Institutionalization of lawmaking by federal courts would represent a major shift in policymaking power 
away from Congress and toward the federal judiciary, in violation of the constitutional scheme.”). 
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1. FOIA’s Text 
The first and most important distinction between FOIA and the rest of the 
APA is textual detail. Administrative common law’s supporters rest much of 
their case on the argument that the APA contains broad, open-ended language 
like “arbitrary” and “capricious” that demands judicial construction.225 As a 
practical matter, some commentators question whether interpreting vague text in 
the APA risks creating even more administrative common law.226 Metzger goes 
further, positing that “Congress’s failure to remove ambiguity and its continued 
reliance on general statutes may indicate that it expects courts to develop 
administrative common law, at least within certain overall statutory 
parameters.”227 And even administrative common law’s opponents concede that 
their concern is primarily with doctrine that defies statutory text.228 
But even assuming that courts have broad latitude to construe statutory text, 
it is uncontroversial that they should not go to war with statutory commands. 
This issue becomes more pronounced in the federal common law context, where 
it is undisputed that a court “must point to a federal enactment, constitutional or 
statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common law rule” it seeks 
to implement.229 Challenging or ignoring statutory text is necessarily 
inconsistent with this baseline. 
Unlike much of the APA, FOIA is textually detailed. It also tells the 
judiciary how to approach ambiguity—in favor of disclosure.230 And yet, courts 
have neutered many of its provisions. Some courts were openly functional or 
policy-focused, not referencing FOIA’s text.231 Others rewrote provisions to 
ensure they were “consonant with reasonableness”232 or “[a] moment’s 
reflection,”233 pursued expansive notions of the absurdity canon,234 or pointed to 
 
 225.   E.g., Metzger, supra note 22, at 1326; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018) 
(empowering courts to vacate agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law”).  
 226.   See Bernick, supra note 41, at 861 (noting this position among commentators).  
 227.   Metzger, supra note 22, at 1327-28. 
 228.   See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 23, at 1211; see also Duffy, supra note 25, at 153 
(concluding that Congress wanted to provide courts “with a range of interpretive flexibility” when it 
adopted the “open-ended” arbitrary and capricious language in the APA). 
 229.   Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 883, 887 (1986). 
 230.   See supra notes 5-8. 
 231.   See, e.g., Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504, 506 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 232.   Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
 233.   CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 234.   E.g., Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 587 F.2d 544, 547 (2d 
Cir. 1978) (“It would be anomalous indeed to attribute to Congress the intention to . . . increase the risk 
of physical harm to those engaged in law enforcement and significantly assist those engaged in criminal 
activity . . . .”). 
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generalized statements from individual legislators or executive officials.235 In the 
final approach, courts in later decisions explicitly relied on policy concerns to 
expand doctrines far beyond even what their friends in legislative history could 
have conceivably supported.236 One dissenting judge aptly described the 
judiciary’s approach to much of FOIA: 
There is an inherent hazard in the process by which our courts flesh out the 
meaning of a statute. Over time, judges adding another link to the precedential 
chain may become so intent on exploring the implications of the last preceding 
case that they lose sight of the statute itself . . . .237 
Even if the judiciary properly adopted pro-government precedent where it has 
discretion,238 much of FOIA’s common law sits in direct tension with statutory 
text. 
2. FOIA’s Origins 
The judiciary’s early decision to frame the APA as a “restatement” was 
critical to the survival of pre-APA equity doctrines.239 It created the perception 
that the statute was “subservient to judge-made doctrine.”240 While courts have 
 
 235.   E.g., Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474-75 (1st Cir. 1979); Nat’l Parks & 
Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 236.   See supra Section II.B. A clear example can be seen in the judiciary’s approach to 
the aforementioned Exemption 2 doctrine. See supra notes 197-211. The early courts that adapted the 
High 2 interpretation relied on a passage from a House Report that construed Exemption 2 as 
encompassing “[o]perating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or 
examiners.” H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2427. For 
reasons beyond this Article’s scope, commentators and early courts called the House Report an “abuse of 
legislative history.” Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 761, 810 (1968); see also Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en 
banc) (describing the House Report’s gloss as “the product of last minute chicanery”). Regardless, the 
first courts to embrace the report hewed roughly close to its language, withholding only investigation 
manuals. E.g., Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 631 F.2d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 1980). But 
even assuming that legislative history is relevant to statutory interpretation, the judiciary’s expansion of 
Exemption 2 into a wide range of basic civilian matters went far beyond any conceivable support in 
legislative history. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text. 
 237.   Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 830 F.2d 278, 287-
88 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., dissenting in part). 
 238.   See supra notes 170, 173. 
 239.   See, e.g., Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir. 
1955); see also United States ex rel. Lindenau et al. v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) 
(“In other words, the Administrative Procedure Act does not in any way modify the existing forms of 
proceedings to review final actions of administrative agencies, nor does it create any new remedies if an 
adequate remedy is in existence.”). But see Unger v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 281, 286 (E.D. Ill. 1948) 
(concluding that “Congress thought they were doing more than codifying existing law” when enacting the 
APA). 
 240.   Duffy, supra note 25, at 119. As Kathryn Kovacs notes, “[c]onservatives sold the 
law as imposing important new restrictions on agencies, while liberals viewed the law as simply restating 
pre-existing common law.” Kovacs, supra note 23, at 1208. However, “[b]y and large, the liberals won” 
and courts treated the APA a restatement that licensed common law. Id. 
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largely retreated from this view,241 the administrative common law debate 
historically centered on whether the APA was truly a restatement or actually 
attempted to displace the law but was stymied by agency lobbying. 
This approach is out of place in FOIA. Even assuming that Congress’s 
ostensible expectations are relevant to the rest of the APA, FOIA is different. 
There is no serious contention, by courts or otherwise, that it merely restated the 
pre-APA framework of agency control over disclosure or reenacted the APA’s 
toothless public disclosure regime. Rather, FOIA represented a sea change in the 
law. In stark contrast to the preexisting regime, it demanded that courts control 
information disclosure, an area previously subject to executive discretion.242 And 
while it adopted many of the government’s preexisting privileges, it situated 
them within a pro-plaintiff framework and imposed additional requirements.243 
Congress has also frequently amended FOIA, including two overrides of 
Supreme Court decisions, signaling its continued desire to control the terms of 
information disclosure.244 As the Supreme Court observed, “In FOIA . . . a new 
conception of Government conduct was enacted into law, ‘a general philosophy 
of full agency disclosure.’”245 Indeed, FOIA is credited with sparking a global 
revolution in favor of government transparency.246  
So one of the foundational justifications for classifying administrative law 
as an enclave of federal common law does not apply in FOIA. In fact, the 
opposite is true. A central tenet of federal common law is that a court’s authority 
dissipates “when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a 
decision rested on federal common law.”247 This displacement occurs when 
Congress passes a statute that simply “speaks directly to the question.”248 
Congress has repeatedly spoken, often in great detail, on the question of 
information disclosure. Federal common law cannot survive in such an 
environment. 
 
 241.   See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) (rejecting the 
restatement view as applied to the APA’s judicial review provisions). Still, this approach has been resistant 
to challenge. See Old Town Trolley Tours of Wash., Inc. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n, 129 F.3d 
201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reasserting the restatement view of the APA’s judicial review provisions). 
 242.   See supra Section II.A. 
 243.   See id. 
 244.   See 1 O’REILLY, supra note 9, §§ 3:8-3:12, at 51-63. 
 245.   Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Prot. Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 16 (2001) 
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989)). 
 246.   See James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” Versus “Access to Evil”: Should 
Disclosure Laws Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 562 
(2002) (describing how states and other countries have used FOIA as a model for their own transparency 
legislation). 
 247.   City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981). 
 248.   Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (alterations 
omitted) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). 
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3. FOIA’s Institutional Concerns 
Administrative common law’s defenders also advance that the method is 
the inevitable product of “systemic and constitutional pressures.”249 This 
functionalist argument rests on three observations: First, an expansive 
presidential power over agencies is “the central dynamic of contemporary 
national governance,” reflecting the President’s role as the politically 
accountable actor for the executive branch.250 Second, because of the high 
institutional cost of passing legislation, Congress is an inefficient body to correct 
the executive when it endorses unauthorized goals.251 And third, the judiciary 
fills the role of “mediating the needs of both political branches for control of 
agency decisionmaking.”252 Administrative common law is the product of this 
mediation, ensuring “that congressional instructions are honored while 
preserving room for presidential policy control.”253 Under this view, many 
administrative common law doctrines, such as Chevron and hard look review, 
simply set the appropriate balance between the political branches.254 
But this account does not fit with FOIA. Considering its frequent 
amendments to the statute, Congress is not “inefficient” in correcting the other 
two branches. More important are its particular commands. FOIA provides 
different, more restrictive instructions to both the executive and judicial 
branches. For the executive, there is nearly no policy discretion to withhold non-
exempt information.255 Unless responsive information falls within one of nine 
“specifically stated” exceptions, an agency must disclose it.256 Congress has also 
directed courts to employ substantive, searching, de novo review that construes 
ambiguity in favor of disclosure.257 FOIA’s common law aggressively resists 
these instructions. 
In short, there should be little for courts to balance. Instead, Congress has 
given direct commands to the other two branches for managing information 
disclosure. And even setting this concern aside, the executive branch’s 
overwhelming win rate suggests that the judiciary gives little weight to 
Congress’s side of the “balance.”  
 
 249.   Metzger, supra note 22, at 1321. 
 250.   Id. at 1332. 
 251.   Id. at 1322-32. 
 252.   Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1753 (2007). 
 253.   Metzger, supra note 22, at 1335. 
 254.   See id. at 1334-36. 
 255.   With limited exceptions, agencies can waive exemptions. See 1 O’REILLY, supra 
note 9, § 9.36, at 1075-77. 
 256.   5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (2018). 
 257.   See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text. 
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4. FOIA and Constitutional Common Law 
Some commentators defend administrative common law as a form of 
constitutional common law—a contested class of judge-created doctrines that 
draw “inspiration and authority from, but [are] not required by, various 
constitutional provisions.”258 As applied to administrative law, proponents 
primarily assert that the method promotes separation-of-powers values.259 That 
is, administrative common law compensates for the Constitution’s silence on 
administrative agencies, which now wield outsized policymaking and 
adjudicatory authority.260 For example, the “reasoned decisionmaking” 
requirement facilitates the ability of all three branches to police agency action, 
ostensibly mitigating nondelegation concerns.261 Under this view, administrative 
common law doctrines work in tandem with statutes and executive policies to 
ensure that the administrative state is “politically responsive, procedurally 
legitimate, and respectful of individual rights.”262 
Setting aside the serious first-order objections to constitutional common 
law,263 it is undisputed that this authority is at least “subject to amendment, 
modification, or even reversal by Congress.”264 Administrative common law’s 
defenders thus acknowledge that judge-made doctrines must submit to statutory 
commands.265 Although, Metzger argues that a higher threshold for statutory 
displacement should exist because of administrative common law’s 
“constitutionally inspired” nature.266 
 
 258.   Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975). 
 259.   See Bremer, supra note 222, at 1222-29; Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 506 (2010); see also 
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2062-74 (2008) 
(detailing judicial doctrines used to incentivize federalism values when agency action could have 
preemptive effects). 
 260.   See Bremer, supra note 222, at 1222-29. 
 261.   See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING 
THE REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990). 
 262.   JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 285 (2012). 
 263.   See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 452, 475 (2010) (arguing that the “primary role” of courts “should be one of enforcing 
the authority of the legislature,” not pioneering constitutional common law); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert 
C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1127-31 (1978) 
(concluding that the Constitution does not authorize constitutional common law). 
 264.   Monaghan, supra note 258, at 3; accord Metzger, supra note 22, at 1341. 
 265.   See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 222, at 1268 (noting that administrative common law 
doctrines “are ‘subject to the paramount authority of Congress’ and should be informed by judicial 
consideration of relevant executive policies and practices” (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers 
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)); Metzger, supra note 22, at 1353 (“Some judicial moves may be deemed 
unsupportable because they simply conflict too much with governing statutes, even acknowledging the 
legitimacy of judicial development in general.”). 
 266.   Metzger, supra note 22, at 1351. 
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As with the APA, FOIA implicates very real constitutional tensions that 
have been litigated since the founding.267 Even the Supreme Court’s strongest 
statement against unchecked executive secrecy, United States v. Nixon, 
recognized that executive privilege was “inextricably rooted in the separation of 
powers under the Constitution.”268 Nixon also took pains to clarify that the 
executive still may have absolute authority to protect diplomatic, national 
security, and military information.269 These concerns (and others) feature 
prominently in FOIA litigation and commentary.270 
And as with the APA, FOIA is of course not immune from constitutional 
scrutiny. If agencies actually challenged FOIA’s provisions on constitutional 
grounds, courts could justifiably scrutinize and possibly refuse to enforce 
statutory text. But agencies have not done so. And FOIA is too detailed to 
support constitutional common law. As discussed, much of FOIA’s common law 
simply ignores clear textual commands. Moreover, Congress has repeatedly 
amended FOIA to spur more disclosure, sometimes in response to judicial 
decisions.271 These amendments have not affected the government’s outsized 
win rate or spurred the judiciary to reconsider the appropriate interbranch 
balance over transparency. 
The tension between congressional commands and the judiciary’s tacit 
constitutional concerns is most pronounced in the national security context. In 
its first Exemption 1 case under FOIA, the Supreme Court held that it would not 
 
 267.   See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34-35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, 
C.J.) (rejecting President Thomas Jefferson’s claim of a constitutionally mandated executive privilege). 
 268.   418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). 
 269.   See id. at 706; see also id. at 707 (“To read the Art. II powers of the President as 
providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no 
more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic 
discussions would upset the constitutional balance of a ‘workable government’ and gravely impair the 
role of the courts under Art. III.” (emphasis added)). Some members of the Nixon majority espoused this 
position in prior opinions. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive—as a matter of sovereign 
prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law—through the promulgation and enforcement 
of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the 
fields of international relations and national defense. . . . [I]f Congress should pass a specific law 
authorizing civil proceedings in this field, the courts would likewise have the duty to decide the 
constitutionality of such a law . . . .”); see also id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Constitution only allows judges to review the executive’s decisions regarding national security 
information to ensure that it followed proper procedures); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 746 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling for an “absolute privilege” for 
confidential presidential communications due to inherent Vesting Clause authority). 
 270.   See, e.g., supra Section I.B.4 (discussing the judiciary’s use of institutional 
competencies to justify deference regimes in FOIA); Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1383, 1418 (1974) (suggesting that FOIA might become unconstitutional if Congress expanded its 
disclosure mandates); Fenster, supra note 16, at 904 (claiming that expanding FOIA’s disclosure demands 
would raise “significant” constitutional concerns because of the executive’s constitutional prerogative 
over information); see also Lebovic, supra note 147, at 24-25 (discussing the separation-of-powers 
concerns that agencies raised during congressional hearings over FOIA).  
 271.   See Tai, supra note 16, at 456-57. 
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review the adequacy of an agency’s decision to classify information.272 Congress 
responded by overriding both the Supreme Court and a presidential veto to 
expressly require courts to substantively review classification decisions de 
novo.273 Construing the amendment as a congressional “vote of confidence” in 
the judiciary to “consider and weigh data” concerning national security,274 the 
D.C. Circuit initially concluded that these provisions “stood in contrast to, and 
[were] a rejection of, the alternative suggestion . . . that in the national security 
context the court should be limited to determining whether there was a 
reasonable basis for the decision.”275 
Now recall the “logical or plausible” standard of review for Exemption 1 
claims.276 It looks suspiciously like “reasonable basis.” As applied, it is 
effectively abdication, representing a challenge to Congress’s override.277 Courts 
have also ignored similar attempts by presidents, who FOIA empowers to set 
classification criteria, to adopt pro-disclosure policies.278 Discussing the 
government’s most prolific classifier, the Ninth Circuit conceded that it was 
“only a short step from exempting all CIA records from FOIA.”279 This 
sentiment largely applies across the government, where successful Exemption 1 
challenges are almost nonexistent.280 
 
 272.   EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973) (holding that once a court determined that a 
record was classified, its inquiry was “at an end”). 
 273.   Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1(b)(2), 
(2), 88 Stat. 1561, 1562 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2018)); see also supra notes 9-12 and 
accompanying text (discussing this amendment). 
 274.   Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 642-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dicta). 
 275.   Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 276.   See supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text. 
 277.   Courts do not take the plaintiff’s role in the adversarial process seriously when 
considering Exemption 1 claims. They “accord[] little or no weight to opinions of persons other than the 
agency classification authority, including persons who may have previously maintained some knowledge 
of the subject matter.” 1 CORNISH F. HITCHCOCK, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND 
PRIVACY ACTS § 6:3, at 171 (2019). For example, courts have refused to consider affidavits written by an 
ambassador who created the requested records, Rush v. Dep’t of State, 748 F. Supp. 1548, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 
1990), and a U.S. Senator who read the information as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
Wash. Post Co. v. Dep’t of Def., No. 84-2949, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16108, at *19 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 
1987). Even when an affidavit’s author is “eminent and well informed,” the affidavit is not “entitled to 
the deference accorded to those who have the statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods.” 
Berman v. CIA, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2005). Similarly, courts have crabbed in camera 
review to “exceptional cases.” Kuzma v. IRS, 775 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1985). The primary rationale for 
this view in the Exemption 1 context is that courts are not in a position to “weigh the repercussions of 
disclosure” if they even tried. Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 278.   For example, President Clinton reformulated classification standards to restrict 
overclassification. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, § 1.8(e), 60 Fed. Reg. 19825, 19,828 (Apr. 17, 1995). But 
as David Pozen notes, “no published opinion . . . remarked on [Clinton’s order] as requiring different 
analysis, or reevaluated . . . precedent in light of it.” Pozen, supra note 20, at 645 n.83. See generally 
§ 552(b)(1) (2018) (requiring the President to establish criteria for classification under Exemption 1 in an 
executive order, while instructing courts to ensure that the information was “in fact properly classified 
pursuant to such executive order”).  
 279.   Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1992) (alteration and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 280.   See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 13, at 715 n.159 (finding no ultimately successful 
challenges to agencies’ Exemption 1 defenses during the study period). 
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It is beyond this Article’s scope to examine what de novo review of 
Exemption 1 claims would look like. It is enough that the current regime—where 
courts are “prohibited from conducting a detailed analysis of the agency’s 
invocation of Exemption 1”281—is impossible to square with FOIA’s text and 
statutory history. Because Congress has spoken clearly on the subject, FOIA’s 
common law is not an appropriate mechanism for relieving the legitimate 
constitutional tensions that government secrecy implicates.282 
* * * 
FOIA is ultimately a pro-disclosure statute that calls for a pro-disclosure 
jurisprudence. But as FOIA’s common law shows, courts have reached a 
different conclusion that calls for agency control. The judiciary’s policy-focused 
approach fails to appreciate the balance that Congress set—one that values 
disclosure over secrecy. While the policies underlying FOIA are certainly up for 
debate, the methodological approach that courts took when establishing the 
statute’s modern jurisprudence is much less defensible. 
B. Understanding FOIA’s Pro-Government Outcomes 
FOIA’s common law provides a chance to explore why courts have targeted 
FOIA, a question that has received comparatively little attention in commentary. 
Existing explanations have been fairly cursory. One critique focused on the 
uncertainty surrounding disclosure, suggesting that “[r]outine deference towards 
the government immunizes the courts from criticism if the low probability of 
large harm occurs.”283 Others chalked FOIA’s outcomes up to judicial views of 
the statute’s merits284 or structural concerns.285 Yet another commentator 
suggested that the unsympathetic nature of FOIA’s typical plaintiffs, such as 
prisoners and business competitors, drives outcomes.286 He also offered that the 
disparity might simply be the product of judicial “skepticism, if not resistance” 
to the statute that produces decisions from a “black box of inarticulate factors.”287 
While there might be some truth to these explanations, they cannot provide 
a complete picture. For instance, they do not address the admittedly rare areas of 
 
 281.   E.g., Associated Press v. FBI, 265 F. Supp. 3d 82, 93 (D.D.C. 2017); Judicial 
Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 337 F. Supp. 2d 146, 162 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 282.   See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (rejecting the 
use of constitutional values to impose heightened judicial scrutiny of agency action). 
 283.   Nevelow Mart & Ginsburg, supra note 110, at 748. 
 284.   Kwoka, supra note 9, at 235-36 (suggesting that FOIA’s failures might come from 
“judges’ underlying views about the merits of FOIA as a transparency tool” and accusing courts of 
“altering the typical discovery process, manipulating the summary judgment standard, and allowing 
[agencies] to rehabilitate failed motions”); accord Slegers, supra note 20, at 215-16. 
 285.   Fenster, supra note 17, at 64-65 (speculating that courts “clipped FOIA 
enforcement at the margins because they implicitly agreed with” warnings against intruding on the 
executive branch’s control over information). 
 286.   Verkuil, supra note 13, at 716, 718. 
 287.   Id. at 718. 
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FOIA doctrine that depart from text but actually favor disclosure.288 Of course, 
FOIA’s common law is not a unified explanation either. But it does suggest two 
additional factors are at play: a preexisting doctrinal baseline and the APA. 
1. Precedent 
Courts did not interpret FOIA on a blank slate. As Part I discussed, many 
of its linchpin doctrines originated in pre-FOIA disputes over government 
secrecy. FOIA’s pro-government outcomes are thus a testament to the power of 
common law precedent. Of course, precedent cannot justify FOIA’s common 
law. But it can provide a descriptive lens for understanding FOIA jurisprudence. 
The common law exerts a potent gravitational pull on statutory interpretation. 
One of the most well-established canons of statutory construction instructs that 
“statutes will not be interpreted as changing the common law unless they effect 
the change with clarity.”289 Many of the motivations underlying this common 
law bias still exist when statutes do “effect the change with clarity.” Among other 
traditional justifications, precedent offers efficiency, consistency, and 
predictability, features that judges are quick to extol.290 These factors exert a 
powerful draw on decisionmakers, even when reliance on precedent is 
unwarranted.291 
Congress set precedential values on a collision course with FOIA. Before 
the statute’s enactment, courts adjudicating discovery disputes against agencies 
had reached a comfortable institutional equilibrium for information 
disclosure.292 This balance of course favored the government. FOIA presented 
judges with the unappealing task of scrapping their baseline and constructing a 
 
 288.   See, e.g., supra Section I.B.2. 
 289.   SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 318; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 44, at 348 
(“Under the common law canon, courts will assume that legislatures act against the background of the 
common law and that relevant common law doctrines will be incorporated into the statute . . . .”). 
Although, this canon is not without longstanding criticism. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and 
Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 388 (1908) (“It is not difficult to show . . . that [the canon] is not 
necessary to and inherent in a legal system; that it is not an ancient and fundamental doctrine of the 
common law; that it had its origin in archaic notions of interpretation generally, now obsolete, and 
survived in its present form because of judicial jealousy of the reform movement; and that it is wholly 
inapplicable to and out of place in American law of today.”). 
 290.   See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 125 (1995) (observing that 
deciding cases without precedent would increase the judicial effort required to decide cases); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 423 (1988) 
(“Precedent not only economizes on information but also cuts down on idiosyncratic conclusions by 
subjecting each judge’s work to the test of congruence with the conclusions of those confronting the same 
problem.”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) 
(arguing that an “obvious advantage” of clear precedents is “predictability” and opining that “[t]here are 
times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all”); see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 
U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable 
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). 
 291.   See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 598 (1987). 
 292.   See CROSS, supra note 58, at 201 (“Practically all the court decisions on the 
production of or access to federal records relate to ‘disclosure’ or non-disclosure in court for evidence or 
other judicial purposes.”).  
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new jurisprudence for information disclosure. This task demanded a 
considerable amount of judicial resources. More gravely, it risked destabilizing 
the existing equilibrium, on which the executive branch had developed 
significant reliance interests. Rather than construct a new balance, judges simply 
dusted off the existing doctrinal baseline and situated it within FOIA. 
FOIA’s jurisprudence can thus be explained in part by path dependence. As 
Justice Scalia observed, “[t]he chances that frail men and women will stand up 
to their unpleasant duty are greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid 
shield of a firm, clear principle enunciated in earlier cases.”293 The first judges 
to interpret FOIA stood alone against longstanding practice. When faced with 
demands to release sensitive but unprotected records, they sought refuge in prior 
holdings.294 And once a court made an initial interpretation, others could simply 
cite that decision rather than re-explain the tensions between FOIA’s text and 
diverging doctrine.295 
2. The APA 
Just as FOIA was not enacted on a blank slate, it did not develop in 
isolation. While courts often present it as a discrete statutory scheme, FOIA is 
formally a part of the APA. And the rest of the APA has clearly influenced 
FOIA’s development. 
This effect is clearest in FOIA’s deference doctrines.296 Rather than depart 
from convention by applying true de novo review, courts quickly adopted a 
strong deference regime for classified information (Exemption 1) that mirrored 
Curtiss-Wright deference, which applies to agency decisions implicating the 
military and foreign affairs.297 And as deference regimes in traditional APA 
litigation became more defined, FOIA doctrine followed suit.298 For example, 
 
 293.   Scalia, supra note 290, at 1180. 
 294.   See, e.g., supra notes 196-198 and accompanying text (discussing lower court 
decisions to maintain their expansive interpretations of Exemption 5 notwithstanding potentially 
conflicting Supreme Court precedent); see also Easterbrook, supra note 290, at 425 (noting that precedent 
“increases the judge’s power of decision” because the judge can simply cite to precedent while “hiding” 
the actual reasoning underlying a decision). 
 295.   For example, the first court to expand Exemption 5 to third-party records did so 
with an offhanded comment in a footnote. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). Multiple circuits adopted Soucie’s holding by citing to this footnote. See supra note 54. 
 296.   See supra Section I.B.4. 
 297.   See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(“[C]ongressional legislation . . . must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom 
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”). Curtiss-
Wright evolved into a form of near-absolute deference to the executive branch on military and foreign 
affairs decisions. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 15, at 1100-01. More generally, Exemption 1 deference 
reflects the well-established state secrets privilege. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876) 
(“It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court 
of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards 
as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.”). 
 298.   See Brinkerhoff & Listwa, supra note 21, at 149-51 (noting the parallels between 
deference doctrines in FOIA and the APA). 
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the first court to adopt the “considerable deference” standard for Exemption 5 
claims justified its decision by citing two then-recent non-FOIA cases involving 
challenges to administrative decisions.299 
A subtler but similar story can be told with FOIA’s procedures. As noted, 
courts have tacitly recreated a version of the appellate review model in FOIA. 
FOIA doctrine joins the rest of the APA in employing strong presumptions 
against discovery and in favor of summary judgment, a review of a limited 
record, and the near-nonexistence of trials. Courts sustain the appellate model in 
FOIA by using agency affidavits as a substitute for the agency “record” and by 
giving the government multiple attempts at summary judgment (with new 
affidavits as a new “record”) as a substitute for remand.300 
Consider also the policy-centered approach that underlies much of FOIA’s 
common law. As with administrative common law, FOIA’s common law 
implicitly endorses a “restatement” view that judges can evolve doctrine beyond 
(or around) statutory text.301 Judges justified many of their interpretations by 
openly embracing prudential values such as “common sense,” “reasonableness,” 
“a practical approach,” “[a] moment’s reflection,” and an aversion to 
“unnecessarily wooden” interpretations.302 This embrace came notwithstanding 
the undisputed view that FOIA did not authorize a restatement approach to 
interpretation. 
Even more broadly, courts gave the executive a vaunted role in interpreting 
FOIA, just as they had done with the APA. Following the passage of both 
statutes, the Attorney General released manuals that interpreted the acts in 
aggressively pro-executive ways.303 Despite considerable criticism over their 
self-interested nature,304 both manuals had an outsized influence on the 
 
 299.   Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 600 F. Supp. 114, 118 
(D.D.C. 1984) (first citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984); and then citing Women’s Equity 
Action League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The court’s only other justification for its novel 
deference regime was that “[c]ourts are being reminded more and more about the deference that they owe 
to administrative agencies in regard to the way these agencies conduct their business.” Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 
600 F. Supp. at 118. 
 300.   See supra Section II.C. 
 301.   See supra Section III.A.2. 
 302.   E.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 478 (1989) (“practical 
approach”); CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[a] moment’s 
reflection”); Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“unnecessarily wooden”); Crooker v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) 
(“reasonableness”); Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“common sense”). 
 303.   See RAMSEY CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
(1967); TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947); see also Davis, supra note 236, at 763 (discussing the FOIA 
manual’s pro-executive valence); Duffy, supra note 25, at 119 (discussing the APA manual’s pro-
executive valence).  
 304.   See, e.g., 1 O’REILLY, supra note 9, § 3.4, at 35 (“It has been generally 
acknowledged that the efforts of [the FOIA manual’s] drafters served to resist efforts to open up agency 
information practices.”); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1683 (1996) (calling the APA manual “a 
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development of pro-executive administrative common law.305 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court determined that both should receive deference as interpretive 
aids.306 
The APA’s influence on FOIA looks like Eskridge and Ferejohn’s 
description of the “colonizing effects” of a “superstatute.”307 That is, certain 
well-entrenched statutes “form a normative backdrop, influencing the way 
[other] statutes are read and applied.”308 To be sure, commentators heavily 
contest Eskridge and Ferejohn’s normative argument that superstatutes justify a 
dynamic view of statutory interpretation.309 But their descriptive conclusion that 
superstatutes exist and exert influence beyond their four corners is 
uncontroversial.310 
Commentators have long observed that the APA functions as “a sort of 
superstatute, or subconstitution, in the field of administrative process: a basic 
framework that was not lightly to be supplanted or embellished.”311 A 
compelling case can be made that as the “‘fundamental charter’ of the ‘Fourth 
Branch’ of the government,”312 the APA exerted a gravitational pull on FOIA’s 
development. FOIA threatened to undermine many of administrative law’s 
foundational conventions, such as agency autonomy over policy implementation. 
To avert such a collision, the judiciary simply “impaired” those provisions of 
FOIA that came in conflict.313 By doing so, it catalyzed the development of 
FOIA’s common law. 
 
transparently one-sided, post hoc interpretation of a done deal”); see also Lebovic, supra note 147, at 14 
(discussing the FOIA manual’s role as part of a broader strategy of executive resistance to disclosure). 
 305.   For example, the “restatement” view of the APA originated in the Attorney 
General’s APA manual. See Duffy, supra note 25, at 119.  
 306.   See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409 (2011) (noting that it had 
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REV. 229, 237-39 (2011) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010)). 
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category of superstatutes with more than ordinary force and stature.” Adrian Vermeule, Superstatutes, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2010), https://newrepublic.com/article/78604/superstatutes [https://perma.cc
/R9VV-SYBA]; see also id. (“Assemble a hundred legal scholars and ask them if there are superstatutes, 
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C. Assessing Congress’s Ability to Overcome FOIA’s Common Law 
The entrenched nature of FOIA’s common law challenges the idea that 
Congress could easily displace administrative common law. Congress’s frequent 
amendments to FOIA have not altered judicial outcomes.314 Even today, FOIA 
has not meaningfully dislodged agency dominance over information disclosure, 
raising interbranch tensions over lawmaking authority. These tensions might 
soon expand beyond FOIA. Congress has recently showed an interest in 
amending not only FOIA but other sections of the APA, raising the specter of a 
second interbranch showdown over administrative common law.315 To this end, 
this Section explores the capacity of Congress to override deeply entrenched 
judicial common law by examining the existing debate over FOIA reform and 
the effect of FOIA’s prior amendments.316 
FOIA’s common law shows that direct statutory commands are not enough 
to overpower judicial inertia. Congress’s previous amendments to FOIA include 
requiring attorney fee payments for prevailing plaintiffs,317 strengthening 
exemption requirements,318 providing additional tools for courts to review 
redactions in camera,319 imposing fee-waiver mandates on agencies that miss 
deadlines,320 and requiring that agencies prove harm from disclosure before 
withholding information.321 While these reforms likely affect agency disclosures 
and judicial decisions at the margins, the judiciary’s continued resistance to 
FOIA’s text shows that they have not been panaceas.322 Simply imposing 
 
 314.   See 1 O’REILLY, supra note 9, §§ 3:8-3:12, at 51-63 (discussing FOIA’s major 
amendments). 
 315.   See Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 631 (2017) (discussing recent congressional attempts to reform the APA). 
 316.   A caveat is warranted. This Article is not concerned with the first-order debate 
over whether FOIA is a desirable approach to transparency. But for context, commentators and 
policymakers have long debated the appropriate balance between transparency and secrecy. Pro-executive 
commentators have predictably criticized the statute as an intrusion on other necessary executive 
functions. Most colorfully, then-Professor Scalia derided FOIA as “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of 
Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored.” Scalia, supra note 
10, at 15; see also Andrew Keane Woods, The Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1, 25-39 (2018) 
(raising similar concerns). Even some transparency advocates have criticized FOIA’s requester-based 
model as an “entitlement program without eligibility criteria” that “may be flawed beyond repair.” David 
E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 
1100, 1136 (2017); see also Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their 
Alternatives in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443 (2012) (discussing pro-transparency 
critiques of the FOIA’s model). But of course there is no shortage of praise for the values of transparency. 
See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1011, 1020 (2008). 
 317.   Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1(b)(2), 
88 Stat. 1561, 1562 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (2018)). 
 318.   See, e.g., id. (codified as amended at § 552(b)(1)). 
 319.   Id. (codified as amended at § 552(a)(4)(B)). 
 320.   FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, § 2, 130 Stat. 538, 538 
(codified at § 552(a)(4)(A)). 
 321.   Id. at 539 (codified at § 552(b)(5)). 
 322.   See, e.g., Tai, supra note 16, at 479 (noting the “slim” chances for courts to actually 
award attorney’s fees). 
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increasingly specific statutory language or persisting in adding more hurdles for 
agencies, as some have suggested,323 will not produce meaningful change. 
Previous reforms did little to address the pro-agency foundations on which courts 
built FOIA’s common law. So FOIA’s common law undermined them in much 
the same way as it undermined FOIA itself. 
Even the boldest reforms might not change the calculus if they fail to 
address the tensions motivating FOIA’s common law. Take for example 
proposals to replace FOIA’s requester-based model with an affirmative 
disclosure regime, which a leading transparency scholar has labeled “the most 
scalable . . . and the most plausible substitute for the traditional FOIA model.”324 
There is nothing inherent in tasking agencies with affirmatively disclosing their 
records that would change preexisting common law incentives in disclosure 
disputes. The concerns underlying FOIA’s exemptions would remain—the CIA 
will still need to withhold properly classified information and the SEC will still 
need to shield confidential corporate information from prying competitors. So 
courts would face the same question: whether to overturn an agency’s secrecy 
decision. Courts designed pre-FOIA doctrines to answer this precise question. 
These doctrines transitioned seamlessly to FOIA despite statutory commands for 
change. The foregoing analysis suggests that courts will yet again default to the 
longstanding pro-executive baseline under an affirmative disclosure regime. 
Legislative reforms can overcome common law inertia only if they address 
the issues underlying the judiciary’s reticence to order disclosure. The most 
obvious solution would be for Congress to look outside the judiciary altogether. 
For example, affirmative disclosure could be enforced not by private citizens and 
courts, but by legislative or administrative forces. While such a reform would 
attract its own problems, it could relieve existing tensions. Non-judicial actors 
will not face the same self-doubts over institutional competency that have racked 
judicial analysis. 
An alternative solution would be to retain judicial enforcement but change 
the question that FOIA asks of judges. Margaret Kwoka has proposed formally 
applying the Chenery principle to FOIA litigation.325 For context, the Chenery 
principle is the component of the appellate review model that limits judicial 
review to the justification an agency offered when originally making its 
decision.326 Courts formally reject Chenery in FOIA but still rely almost 
exclusively on agency affidavits (substitutes for agency records) and allow the 
government to have “do-overs” (substitutes for remands).327 Still, formally 
adopting the Chenery principle—that is, limiting agencies to their original 
 
 323.   See, e.g., Kwoka, supra note 9, at 241 (arguing for a direct repudiation of FOIA’s 
deference doctrines and presumption against discovery); Slegers, supra note 20, at 234-35 (proposing an 
increase in the use of special masters to examine factual disputes in FOIA litigation). 
 324.   See Pozen, supra note 316, at 1149. 
 325.   See Kwoka, supra note 185, at 1064-65. 
 326.   See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
 327.   See supra Section II.C. 
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reasoning and remanding insufficient explanations to agency decisionmakers—
would fundamentally alter the nature of FOIA litigation. Kwoka contends that 
the review-and-remand process would have the benefit of a “reversal-lite” 
approach that rescues judges from actually having to order disclosure.328 The 
question would shift from whether to actually order disclosure to whether the 
agency adequately justified its decision. 
While judges have never been comfortable affirmatively ordering agency 
action, they clearly embrace the task of second-guessing agencies and enjoining 
action. This extends beyond adopting a strong presumption in favor of reviewing 
and potentially remanding agency decisions.329 Even in highly specialized or 
technical areas, courts employ searching reviews that ostensibly ensure agency 
decisions consider appropriate factors, respond to known critiques, and address 
alternative approaches.330 Indeed, some commentators contend that courts have 
been so willing to review agencies’ decision-making processes that agency 
action has “ossified” under the weight of excessive judicial review.331 
On the surface, then, such a proposal might fit with FOIA. Formal adoption 
would provide a broader mechanism to incentivize agency reason-giving.332 And 
the added labor of actually reconsidering a FOIA request might prod agencies to 
consider more carefully whether to fight disclosure. But this proposal should 
give cause for concern if adopted in isolation. Because both the executive and 
judicial branches have historically resisted FOIA’s commands, formally 
adopting the Chenery principle might simply reallocate decisionmaking to 
another hostile entity, creating new problems.  
Consider agency delay. In most other areas of administrative law, agencies 
actively push for change. They generally have little incentive to delay their 
internal decisionmaking. But under FOIA, agencies prefer the status quo and 
thus, delay. Indeed, a major critique of FOIA is the frequent tendency of agencies 
to delay responding to requests, even for years, effectively reaching a 
constructive denial without ever issuing a decision.333 One of the few tools 
requesters have to force agency action is filing a lawsuit.334 While initiating 
litigation is not an ideal solution, adopting the Chenery principle wholesale 
would challenge even this limited remedy. 
 
 328.   Kwoka, supra note 185, at 1113-17. 
 329.   See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
 330.   See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
42-43 (1983). 
 331.   See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to 
Collaboration and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 
171 (2017); see also Kirby M. Smith, In-House Regulators: Documenting the Impact of Regulation on 
Internal Firm Structure, 36 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 22, 27 (2018) (concluding that hard look review has 
made “the status quo sticky”). 
 332.   See Kwoka, supra note 185, at 1113-17. 
 333.   See H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, supra note 17, at 34; Tai, supra 
note 16, at 465-68. 
 334.   If an agency fails to respond to a FOIA request within the twenty-day deadline, 
the requester can appeal the decision as a constructive denial. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(C)(i) (2018). 
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To start, Chenery presumes that a court actually has an agency record to 
review, which is a problem when agencies are the parties creating delay. The 
current practice of suing to force action would simply task a court with reviewing 
an agency record that does not exist. There would be no reconsideration on 
remand but rather a first attempt at review, preceded only by the expense and 
effort of filing a lawsuit. And even if a proper remand occurs, there is also no 
guarantee that an agency would reach a new decision within a reasonable period 
of time after remand. The process could compound existing delays. 
Congress would need to take additional measures to catalyze agency action. 
For example, it could retain the “constructive denial” provision but also allow 
courts to retain jurisdiction after remand to secure compliance.335 They already 
have this authority when supervising agency record searches.336 More boldly, 
Congress could further integrate FOIA into the administrative model by 
replacing the internal appeals process with an adjudication in front of an 
administrative law judge, although this shift would be fraught with its own 
problems.337 Or it could direct internal appeals to a Freedom of Information 
Commission, a process that has seen success at the state level.338 Doing so would 
create a different “record” for judicial review. It would also place the judiciary 
in an oversight capacity that does not demand agency-like “expertise.” Further, 
it would facilitate Congress’s desire for closer examination of agency rationales 
without the risk of burdening Article III courts with tedious factfinding. 
Of course, any major change to FOIA would risk creating other problems. 
Crafting a new reform proposal is ultimately beyond this Article’s scope. But the 
foregoing analysis suggests this much: Simply reinforcing the existing 
framework has not worked. If Congress continues to challenge the other two 
branches by asserting its authority in this area, its efforts are best directed at 
undermining the longstanding tensions motivating the judiciary’s reticence to 
question the executive’s secrecy decisions. 
 
 335.   For a discussion of this practice in other areas of administrative law, see 
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GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1590 (2014). 
 336.   5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (2018). 
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option at least once before. See H.R. 4960, 93d Cong. (1973).  
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D. Lessons for Administrative Common Law 
FOIA’s common law sheds new light on the larger debate over 
administrative common law. As discussed, administrative common law’s 
defenders offer several ostensibly benign explanations for the judiciary’s 
outsized role in administrative law—courts are simply resolving statutory 
ambiguities, fulfilling a congressional mandate to treat the APA as a restatement, 
compensating for congressional inaction and a dynamic executive, or promoting 
constitutional values.339 
The arguments are “benign” because each concedes that Congress retains 
primacy over lawmaking. Every major defender of administrative common law 
agrees that judge-made doctrine must submit to enacted statutes when the two 
conflict.340 This concession is necessary. Even the strongest proponents of 
“dynamic” interpretation admit that courts must respect legislative overrides to 
preserve separation-of-powers values.341 But while it is easy to promise 
congressional control in the abstract, it is much more difficult to test the 
proposition as a descriptive matter. Congress has rarely amended the APA, much 
less overridden an administrative common law doctrine.342 Beyond the well-
worn debates over the APA’s original language, it is hard to test judicial fealty 
to congressional commands. 
FOIA is a different story. Congress has amended FOIA more than any other 
part of the APA. Those amendments, nearly all of which sought to spur more 
disclosure, have been far more substantive than the limited amendments 
elsewhere in the statutory regime.343 And even setting these amendments aside, 
FOIA’s provisions are much more detailed than the rest of the APA. Indeed, 
Metzger briefly alluded to FOIA’s textual detail in her leading defense of 
administrative common law, citing Milner as a possibly justified decision to 
abrogate common law that conflicts with statutory language.344 
As this Article has explained, these measures have not meaningfully 
empowered the judiciary to assume control over transparency decisions. 
Although courts agree in principle that they can adjudicate FOIA claims, they 
 
 339.   See supra Section III.A. 
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maintain an overwhelming agency win rate and regularly question their own 
institutional competency.345 FOIA’s outcomes suggest that courts have largely 
decided to abnegate control to the executive branch notwithstanding Congress’s 
commands otherwise. 
One of FOIA’s common law’s clearest upshots, then, is its challenge to the 
idea that administrative common law is a justified form of federal common law. 
Rather than filling in statutory gaps or smoothing latent interbranch tensions, 
FOIA jurisprudence suggests that courts simply favor administrative common 
law over statutory text, as the examples in Part I documented. This preference 
appears even when it is beyond doubt that the two conflict—for example, with 
judicial resistance to Congress’s override of the Supreme Court’s Exemption 1 
doctrine.346  
This practice is also apparent in subtler ways, such as through the adoption 
of additional procedural hurdles or other doctrinal shifts that counterbalance 
statutory changes. Consider FOIA’s sanctions provision, which Congress 
enacted with great fanfare in 1974.347 It is expansive, triggering a special counsel 
investigation when (1) a court orders document production, (2) awards attorney 
fees, and (3) “issues a written finding that the circumstances surrounding the 
withholding raise questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously with respect to the withholding.”348 Plaintiffs have almost never 
successfully invoked this provision. Indeed, it appears that only three courts have 
ever found that an agency violated the sanctions provision.349 Part of this rarity 
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is likely due to first-order success of agencies in preventing disclosure. But 
courts still do not recommend sanctions even when the only question is whether 
the agency’s conduct “raise[s] questions” of arbitrary and capricious action.  
Some courts have assumed that the provision requires plaintiffs to raise 
specific evidence to meet the standard, even when the agency did not provide an 
explanation for its actions.350 Others have refused to find for plaintiffs by holding 
that bad faith or undisputedly unreasonable behavior are not questionably 
arbitrary and capricious,351 adding a requirement that the requester’s injury must 
be more than minimal,352 recognizing an agency’s belated attempts to cure 
unquestionably arbitrary and capricious behavior,353 or simply declining to 
recommend sanctions without explanation.354 These demands appear 
irreconcilable with a statute that requires an agency’s conduct to only “raise 
questions” of arbitrary and capricious behavior.  
In short, the modern state of FOIA jurisprudence suggests that existing 
theories of administrative common law might overstate the judiciary’s 
willingness to cede ground to Congress. Regardless of its theoretical limits, 
administrative common law’s application in FOIA indicates that future 
congressional amendments to other parts of the APA might not be honored in 
practice. 
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Conclusion 
This Article has argued that FOIA’s modern jurisprudence cannot be 
properly understood in isolation. Instead, it fits neatly within the administrative 
common law paradigm. Like the APA, courts grounded many of FOIA’s 
foundational doctrines in functional or structural concerns rather than statutory 
text. Tellingly, these doctrines were quite similar to pre-FOIA administrative and 
discovery common law, suggesting that courts treated FOIA like the rest of the 
APA—a restatement of existing law that ostensibly licensed dynamic 
interpretation. And because pre-FOIA doctrines both overwhelmingly favored 
the executive and were procedurally incompatible with FOIA’s disclosure 
model, the ensuing jurisprudential landscape predictably favors the government. 
Recognizing FOIA’s common law provides a firm baseline for 
understanding and critiquing the tension between FOIA’s text and outcomes. But 
it also offers broader lessons. It adds context to the administrative common law 
debate, suggesting that existing accounts do not fully appreciate the judiciary’s 
resilience to congressional commands that conflict with its common law 
framework. Relatedly, FOIA’s common law highlights the perils of looking 
beyond statutory text in interpretation. By relying on a preexisting common law 
equilibrium, courts have, at least in the telling of most commentators, reduced a 
monumental superstatute into a “failure.” And in the process, they have undercut 
Congress’s authority to determine what the law should be. 
